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One way to understand tort law is as a functional response
to the social problem of accidental personal injury. That puts the
negligence action at the center, and emphasizes the doctrinal choice
between negligence and strict liability, while downplaying the in-
tentional torts and the torts that do not involve physical injury. It
also foregrounds the policy choice between tort and other means of
dealing with accidents. This functional treatment is not uncontro-
versial today, but it is certainly orthodox.1
Here I propose to bring back into view some neglected as-
pects of the intellectual origins of the accident-centered approach to
tort law. When torts was emerging as an important doctrinal cate-
gory in the common-law world during the late nineteenth century,
the early commentator who did the most to organize it around the
problem of accidental injury was the young Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. The influential slant he gave to the subject turns out to have
resulted from his struggle with doubts, surprising and possibly in-
structive to us, about whether torts was a viable legal category at
all.
Neither Holmes' doubts about torts nor the theory with
which he resolved them had much to do with his views about proper
social policy toward industrial accidents. He was mainly responding
to the inner dynamics of a juristic debate about the taxonomic ar-
rangement of the substantive law, a debate that had been triggered
1. Its orthodoxy would be underscored by the ALI's adoption of Professor Schwartz's now
draft of "general principles" for the Restatement of Torts, the occasion for this symposium. The
draft purports to govern, not tort law as a whole, or even the tort of negligence as a whole, but
only the action for negligent personal injury or property damage. The principles governing this
action are said to be "general" despite their restricted domain because-as the perspective I
mention presupposes--"the problem of accidental injury" is "the core of tort law." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES, Reporter's Introductory Note (Discussion Draft Apr. 5,
1999) [hereinafter Discussion Draft]. That the approach continues to be controversial is brought
out by Professors Goldberg and Zipursky's article in the present symposium, criticizing the use of
this "core" approach to justify reduced emphasis on the traditional duty element in the negli-
gence action. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Third Restatement and the Place
of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657 (2001). By contrast, the First and Second Re.
statements did not begin with a treatment of accidental injury but gave the intentional torts
pride of place as the first subject dealt with, following the traditional organization laid down by
the first Harvard torts casebook. JAMES BARR AMES & JEREMIAH SMITH, A SELECTION OF CASES
ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1875).
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by the legislative abolition of the common-law forms of action. Ju-
rists drawing on conceptual traditions inherited from Roman law
favored adopting tort as a basic category, while those influenced by
the analytical jurisprudence of Bentham and Austin pressed the
other way. After first taking the Bentham-Austin side, Holmes dis-
covered that centering tort law around the problem of accidents
could justify its recognition as an important subject after all.
Coincidentally, the burst of personal injury litigation that
accompanied the growth of railroads and factories in the late nine-
teenth century made Holmes' accident-centered formulation of tort
law especially salient in practical terms, and his theory went on to
gain the dominant position it holds today, at least in the United
States. It thus turned out that in resolving an abstruse theoretical
puzzle about the arrangement of the law in the way he did, Holmes
was helping to construct an understanding of torts that is still
dominant a century later, when its origins have largely been forgot-
ten. As a final twist, we now have our own quite different doubts
about torts, based more on concerns about accident policy than on
views about conceptual arrangement-and the accident-centered
conception that Holmes devised to justify the subject in the first
place turns out to leave it especially vulnerable to these doubts.
I'll start by sketching a version of the accident-centered con-
ception of torts as it exists today-the one I teach in my own intro-
ductory course on the subject. Then I'll show why torts was by no
means certain to become a fundamental category, a subject taught
in every law school, at the time our basic legal taxonomy emerged
in the late nineteenth century. Next I'll trace the steps through
which Holmes moved from his early rejection of torts as a category
to justifying it as a body of law organized around negligence and
accidental injury. Finally, I'll note the difficulties that the accident-
centered conception poses for the continued survival of torts as a
primary division of our substantive law today.
I. WHAT IS A TORT?
Students come to law school with ideas about contracts,
property, crime, and constitutions, but "tort" is a purely legal term
corresponding to none of their ordinary notions or experiences.
Telling them that it is a French word for "wrong" doesn't help
much; a breach of contract is a civil wrong too, and they will learn
that not all tort liability involves wrongdoing.
So I begin my introductory course in torts not with a defini-
tion, but with a sketch of its relation to the rest of the introductory
2001] 1227
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curriculum, which I map using the distinctions between private and
public, civil, and criminal, and substantive and procedural law.
These distinctions mark off constitutional law, criminal law and
civil procedure respectively, leaving the substantive private-law
subjects: torts, contracts, and property. Private civil liabilities can
then be divided between those arising from agreement and those
"imposed by law"-between contract and tort.2 Cutting across this
division, property law defines entitlements and regulates their ac-
quisition, use and transfer.
The map helps locate torts, but still leaves it looking like a
misshapen semi-catchall category-the substantive law governing
some of the private civil liabilities that are not based on contract.
The lack of a good definition can be partly offset by supplying some
internal structure, and to that end I classify tort doctrines along
two dimensions: the interests they protect, and the levels of culpa-
bility they require. I divide the interests into three classes: physical
security of person and possessions; intangible personal interests in
reputation, privacy, and emotional tranquility; and purely pecuni-
ary assets and expectations. And crosscutting those interests are
the three standard levels of culpability: serious wrongdoing (intent
or malice), negligence, and strict liability.
I tell my students that rather than surveying the whole re-
sulting three-by-three matrix, we will focus on accidental physical
injury. That means omitting the intentional torts involving force
and fraud; the business torts; the torts linked to land use; and the
torts protecting intangible personal interests-defamation, invasion
of privacy, and infliction of emotional distress. I have my excuses
for each omission, 3 but still it is a lot to leave out. The justification
is my judgment that accidental injury is what tort law is really all
about.
This is easy enough to show practically and politically, at
least in the United States, where accident claims are at the heart of
2. This division is of course very rough. Contractual liability is "imposed by law" as much
as any other kind, at least on some views. Unjust enrichment is often recognized as a third cato-
gory of private common-law civil liability apart from tort and contract; and there are civil liabili-
ties (for instance, for breach of trust) that for historical reasons get left out of the standard pri-
vate-law categories. An old-fashioned but still interesting conceptual investigation of the rola-
tions of torts to other legal categories is PERCY WINFIELD, THE PROVINCE OF THE LAW OF TORTs
(1931).
3. Doctrine governing torts of force and fraud closely tracks the substantive criminal law;
the business torts are dealt with in connection with legal regulation of the market; nuisance and
trespass come in under property law; and defamation, privacy, and emotional distress are dealt
with in an advanced torts course.
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the "tort crisis" and the calls for "tort reform." But does this concen-
tration obscure something important about the nature of tort law? I
take the question seriously, knowing that there are thoughtful
scholars who say that it does, 4 and that the first impressions I am
imprinting on my students will tend to stick.
Portraying tort doctrines as responses to the accident prob-
lem means asking how well they deter unsafe conduct and help
cushion shocks to injury victims, and also comparing them to alter-
native ways of pursuing those goals. One kind of traditional social
insurance legislation, worker's compensation, was deliberately
adopted to replace tort as the main legal regime for dealing with
accidental injuries in the workplace, and more recently no-fault
plans have partly replaced tort for automobile accidents in some
jurisdictions. Cases on the pre-emption of state tort law by federal
regulation show how Congress sees the personal injury suit as a
regulatory weapon to be unleashed when more deterrence is wanted
and withdrawn when deregulation is the order of the day.
A look abroad reveals that most advanced economies have
more extensive social insurance for medical care and disability than
does the United States. It is probably no coincidence that they also
have less prominent tort systems. Most dramatically, New Zealand
has virtually abolished tort liability for accidental injury, replacing
it with expanded worker's compensation, supplemented by safety
regulation and national health insurance. Tort law taught with a
focus on accidents naturally translates into "tort law and alterna-
tives," which then threatens to become "accident law"-a subject
within which, as the New Zealand experience shows, torts itself
might play no role at all.
The focus on accidents also shapes the sequence of topics. We
start with the common law's choice of negligence over strict liability
as the default regime for accidental injury, and then work through
the elements of the negligence cause of action: duty (or duty limita-
tion), breach, causation (proximate and factual), injury, the de-
fenses, and damages. Next, we consider the pockets of strict liabil-
ity for personal injury, attending to economic and other theories of
enterprise liability. Finally, we take up the alternative ways of
dealing with accidents, looking first at the interplay of insurance
4. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 3-8 (1995) (objecting to purposive or
problem-based treatment of torts); Patrick Kelley, Who Decides? Community Safety Conventions
at the Heart of Tort Liability, 38 CLEV. ST. L REV. 315, 327 (1990) (arguing for the conceptual
centrality of the intentional torts); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure of
Negligence Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 649 (1998) (arguing for the essential inclusion within neg-
ligence of claims for purely pecuniary loss).
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and tort, then at worker's compensation and auto no-fault, and con-
cluding with the threat (or promise) of general tort abolition ("but
not before the exam!") A la New Zealand.
My course thus gives tort doctrine a structure, with negli-
gence at the center, flanked peripherally by the intentional and the
strict liability torts. And it likewise gives the subject a correspond-
ing central domain, the problem of accidental physical injury. I
might teach it in another way, with different implications; this or-
ganization is chosen, not simply discovered. And it happens that its
prototype was originally not so much chosen as invented, largely by
Holmes, when torts was first emerging as a basic category of sub-
stantive law. I turn now to an account of the conceptual choices he
faced, choices that are still mirrored in the pedagogic decisions I
confront in organizing my introductory course.
II. A PROPER SUBJECT?
When Holmes began his law studies at Harvard in 1864, it
was still debatable whether torts would be a fundamental common-
law subject. As recently as a decade before, when the prominent
American legal commentator Joel Bishop had proposed a treatise on
tort law, the publishers responded that "there was no call for a
work on that subject, and there could be no sale for it."' Times were
changing, however, and the first two torts treatises, Francis Hil-
liard's in America and Charles Addison's in England, appeared by
the end of the 1850s. Though both were impressive as first efforts, G
neither of them did much to justify tort law as a basic legal cate-
gory. They proceeded seriatim through the recognized civil causes of
action existing apart from contract, summarizing the applicable
case law that had been developed under the actions for trespass,
trespass on the case, and trover, but without giving their subject
5. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE NON-CONTRACT LAW 2, §3, n.2 (1889).
Bishop had gained prominence with his treatise Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and
Divorce, published in 1852. On the place of Bishop in nineteenth-century legal thought, see gon-
erally the splendid account in Stephen A. Siegel, Joel Bishop's Orthodoxy, 13 LAW & HIST. REV.
215 (1995).
6. As Brian Simpson observes, "in treatise writing, as in mountaineering, a special signifi-
cance is rightly accorded to those who achieve firsts and thereby demonstrate that the feat is in
fact possible." A. W. B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the
Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 652 (1981).
1230 [Vol. 54:3:1225
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either a useful definition, a clear internal structure, or a distinctive
substantive domain. 7
One development that helped stimulate the emergence of
substantive law categories such as torts was the reform of civil pro-
cedure. Starting with New York's Field Code in 1848, legislatures
throughout the common-law world abolished the old writs and their
offshoots in favor of the unitary "civil action," under which plain-
tiffs were simply to plead facts that established grounds for the re-
lief sought.8 The common law had long been taught and indexed
under the formidably technical and notoriously unsystematic cata-
log of forms of action. This meant there was no need to classify law
into substantive departments like property, contract, and tort.9 In
fact the term and even the concept "substantive law," conceived as
the opposite of "law of procedure," was first brought to prominence
by the mid-century movement to reform civil procedure.' 0
7. The list-like tables of contents in both Hilliard's and Addison's treatises evidence the
lack of structure in their approaches to the subject. See CHARLES ADDISON, 1 A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF TORTS v-xxiii (1860); FRANCIS HILLIARD, 1 THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WVRONGS .Xin-
xx (1861). Looking back in 1899 on his own early efforts at a systematic treatment of tort law,
Holmes recalled how 'illiard on Torts... proceeds by enumeration in successive chapters
through assault and battery, libel and slander, nuisance, trespass, conversion, etc." Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 451 (1899) [hereinaf-
ter Law in Science], reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 406, 411
(Sheldon IV. Novick ed., 1995) [hereinafter WORKS].
8. See the contemporaneous account of the procedural reforms in JOHN NORTON PO.MEROY,
REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS (1876). By that time, twenty American states had adopted
some version of the reformed procedure, following the lead given by New York's enactment of the
Field Code in 1848. England, the homeland of the common law, swung into line with the adop-
tion of the Judicature Act of 1873, following the earlier Common Law Procedure Act of 1852. The
standard account of the mid-century reforms as a sudden "abolition of the writ system" is a bit
misleading;, evolution in the direction of a unified system of civil procedure had been going on for
some time before the reform legislation of the latter half of the century.
9. Holmes wrote in 1871 that New York had been "clearly right in giving up the common-
law forms of action." A system based on forms would be defensible if it matched "a form of action"
to "every substantial duty," but the common-law forms were "arbitrary in character," rooted in
"purely historical causes" and were "a positive hindrance to sound legal conceptions." Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Book Review, 5 AM. L. REV. 359, 359 (1871), reprinted in I WORKS, supra note
7, at 239, 239.
10. It was Jeremy Bentham who made the distinction between substantive law and proce-
dure (or substantive and adjective law) prominent. Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Judicial Pro-
cedure with the Outlines of a Procedure Code [hereinafter Principles of Judicial Procedure], in 2
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 5 (John Bowring ed., 1962). Bentham's dichotomy differs
from the older "right-remedy" distinction, and from the Roman-civilian distinction between "law
of persons" and "law of things" on the one hand, and "law of actions" (procedure and remedies) on
the other. The older conceptions included in the concept of "remedy" both the rules governing
what actual relief or sanctions the law provided (injunction, compensatory damages, punitive
damages, criminal penalties), and the procedures through which disputes were litigated. The
Benthamite scheme brings the former rules within the substantive law, which governs both the
rights and duties of the parties, and what the law will do for or to them. The title of POMEROY,
supra note 8, shows the persistence of the older terminology in a book entirely concerned with
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The opening given to legal theory by procedural innovation
caught the attention of a new generation of legal intellectuals in
England and America who wanted to make the study of law into a
modern "scientific" discipline on the model of German legal scholar-
ship. In company with others of his generation, the young Holmes
eagerly took up the challenge of developing a new rational and sys-
tematic classification of substantive law." He started in 1867
writing for the American Law Review, the new organ of advanced
legal scholarship, and over the next few years, he intensely pursued
the project of reclassifying the substantive law, while immersing
himself in the details of established and emerging legal doctrine. 12
It says a lot about the unsettled state of the scheme of legal
categories at the time that the young Holmes-a lawyer steeped in
traditional learning, and at the same time ambitious for intellectual
reform-could conclude in an 1871 review that "[t]orts is not a
proper subject for a law book." 13 Within two years, though, he had
changed his mind, and in his 1873 essay "The Theory of Torts," he
formulated a structural account of tort law very close to the one we
use today. Implicit in this account was a focus on accidental injury
as the primary domain of torts-a focus that has continued to shape
our view of the field ever since, while never becoming entirely un-
controversial. To get a sense of Holmes' analysis of tort law and
how he arrived at it, we need to understand the intellectual and
practical context from which he started. What led him to find torts
"not a proper subject" in 1871?
civil procedure, and not at all with remedies in the modern sense of what modes of relief or sanc-
tions the law makes available.
11. G. Edward White points out that the movement for a "scientific" classification of sub.
stantive law, from which torts emerged as a primary category, was not simply an offshoot of the
procedural reforms of the post-1850 period, but also had independent impetus in the rise of uni-
versity-based legal education in the United States and England around the same time, and the
associated interest of a new group of scholars in law as an autonomous subject inviting system-
atic conceptual elaboration. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY 3-19, esp. 8-11 (1985).
12. On the theoretical side, Holmes read Maine, Bentham, and Austin, and Roman and ci-
vilian sources; reviewed jurisprudential writings for the American Law Review; and wrote essays
on the form of the law. On the practical side, he digested and reviewed the most recent volumes
of case reports, also for the American Law Review, and undertook to edit the twelfth edition of
Kenes Commentaries, which meant mastering essentially all the important legal developments
of the previous two decades in England and the United States. For a detailed account of his in-
tellectual development during this period, see MARK DE WOLFE HOWE, 1 JUSTICE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES 264-86 (1957), and MARK DE WOLFE HOWE, 2 JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES 16-95 (1963).
13. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Review, 5 AM. L. REV. 340, 341 (1871), reprinted in 1
WORKS, supra note 7, at 237, 237 (reviewing C.G. ADDISON, THE LAW OF TORTS (1870)).
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A. In Favor of Torts
Even by that date the odds were good that torts would
emerge as a basic private law category. There were the Hilliard and
Addison treatises, both successful enough to have justified further
editions during their first decade. Torts was included as an elemen-
tary subject in the up-to-date curriculum recently established by
the reforming Dean Langdell at Harvard Law School, the new cen-
ter of legal science in the common-law world. And the subject was
being taught there by one of the most innovative of the younger
generation of legal scholars, Nicholas St. John Green. 14 The factors
favoring acceptance of the subject included its long-standing promi-
nence in Roman and civil law theory and commentary; its recogni-
tion by authoritative common-law commentators, pre-eminently
Blackstone; and its manifestation in the actual statutory and deci-
sional law of the common-law jurisdictions.
1. Roman and Civil Law
In his portrayal of Greek ideas about justice, Aristotle di-
vided claims for rectification into those based on voluntary and in-
voluntary transactions respectively, 15 and the classical law of Rome
made a corresponding fundamental distinction between contract
and tort, legal obligations ex contractu and ex delicto. This concep-
tual framework was canonized by the commentators who restated
Roman law into a general civil law for Europe, later was attributed
14. See id. (describing the teaching of torts at Harvard by an unnamed instructor); CHARLES
WARREN, 2 HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL CONDITIONS IN
AIERICA 375-76 (1908) (identifying St. John Green as instructor for the first torts class taught
at Harvard, 1870-71). Green was one of the earliest contributors to the theory of torts. See
Nicholas St. John Green, Book Notice, 4 AM. L. REV. 350 (1870) (reviewing SHEARMA.N1 AND
REDFIELD, A TREATISTE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (1869)) [hereinafter Green, Book Review];
and especially his article on proximate cause, Nicholas St. John Green, Proximate and Remote
Cause, 4AM. L. REV. 201 (1870), reprinted in 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 452 (1954). Had he lived, Green
might get some of the credit for the innovations in tort theory ascribed in this article to Holmes,
who was notoriously stingy in acknowledging the most important sources of his own ideas. See
Jerome Frank, A Conflict with Obliuion Some Observations on the Founders of Legal Pragma-
tism, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 425, 426.27 (1954) (implying Green's large role as a source of Holmes'
ideas).
15. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V, ch. 2 (W. D. Ross trans.), in THE BASIC
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1006 (R. McKeon ed., 1941) (distinguishing claims arising out of "volun-
tary" transactions such as "sale, purchase, loan for consumption, pledging, loan for use, deposit-
ing, letting" from those arising out of "involuntary" transactions such as "theft, adultery, poi-
soning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness ... assault, imprisonment,
murder, robbery with violence, mutilation, abuse, insult").
2001] 1233
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to the very Law of Nature itself by the philosophical legal writers of
the Enlightenment, and finally, during the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, was enacted into the civil codes of major European
nation states.
The structure originally established for Roman law by the
Institutes of Gaius and Justinian, and thereafter generally followed
by the writers in the civilian tradition, was roughly as follows.
Public law (including criminal law) was distinguished from private
law, and later came to be largely ignored by the post-medieval ci-
vilians, for whom Roman law essentially meant Roman private
law. 16 Private law was then divided into three basic categories: the
law of persons (status), the law of things, and the law of actions
(remedies and procedure). The widest category, the law of things,
was further divided into bodies of law governing property, succes-
sions, and obligations. Obligations, finally, were subdivided into
those arising out of promise or agreement (ex contractu), and out of
wrongs or torts (ex delicto).17
The natural law writers of the Enlightenment added further
prestige to the Roman-civilian system by smoothing over its more
parochial details, and then attributing the remaining abstract
structure to the dictates of Reason itself. The philosophers of the
law of nature varied in how closely they followed the standard Ro-
man law structure, but most of them recognized some version of the
civilian category of tort or delict, encompassing duties to make
reparation for loss wrongfully inflicted. 18 The social contract and
16. There is a brief account of criminal law toward the end of Justinian's Institutes, THE
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, bk. IV, tit. xviii (entitled De Publicis Judiciis) (Thomas Collett San-
dars ed. & trans., 1922), but in general the "law relating to [public or criminal or religious mat.
ters] was, as it were, 'factored out' of the civil law, which became synonymous with private law,"
PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 13 (1999).
17. BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 60, 98-99, 158-59 (1962); REINHARD
ZIMMERMANN, LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 10-29 (1992). The categorization in Justinian's Institutes
also included two minor divisions, quasi-contract (roughly our law of unjust enrichment), and
quasi-delict, a category not readily understandable as based on any general principle, but con-
ceivably embodying Roman notions of strict liability in tort.
18. On the passage of the post-reception Roman law through natural law theorizing to form
the modern Civil Law, see the classic account in FRANZ WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW
IN EUROPE 199-275 (Tony Weir trans., 1995). The prototype is the treatment in HUGO GROTIUS,
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF HOLLAND 459-87 (R. W. Lee trans., 1926) (1631), which summarized the
Dutch law of delictual obligation in terms derived from Roman law, at the same time justifying
the doctrine by reference to the requirements of universal Reason, see id. See also SAMUEL
PUFENDORF, LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS, Book III (Basil Kennett trans., 1717) (giving an
account of the law of obligations as part of natural law); THOMAS RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF
NATURAL LAW 200-08 (1754) (sketching outlines of tort law under title "Of Reparation for Dam-
age Done"). Pufendorf outlined tort law in Chapter 1 of Book III under the title, "That no Man be
hurt; and if a Damage be done to any Man, that Reparation be made." He then treated contract
1234 [Vol. 54:3:1225
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natural rights political philosophy of the time readily classified pri-
vate legal obligations into those imposed by law to protect the basic
individual rights to life, liberty, and property, and those under-
taken by the free consent of the individual-obligations of tort and
contract respectively.
In the wake of the Enlightenment, civilian legal commenta-
tors like Pothier in France and Savigny in Germany further gener-
alized and abstracted the doctrines of Roman law under the influ-
ence of natural law thought and later of Kantian philosophy. The
commentators emerged with tort and contract doctrines that pro-
vided the basis for the treatment of these subjects in the French
Civil Code as well as those of Austria and Prussia. During the nine-
teenth century, these doctrines were further refined under the in-
fluence of the historical school of jurisprudence in the great German
Pandectist commentaries that would lay the basis for the ultimate
monument of civilian legal science, the German Civil Code of
1900.19
Sophisticated English and American legal writers had long
promoted the study of Roman and civil law on the ground that it
supplied a more logical and elegant arrangement than the common-
law writ system. 20 So when in the mid-nineteenth century the aboli-
tion of the forms of action required a new arrangement based on
substantive law categories, it was natural to look to the civil law-
where an impressive body of literature defined and elaborated the
distinctions between property and obligations and then between
contract and tort.
During the final period of transition from the writ system to
the new simplified civil procedure, from about 1850 on, English and
law (the other half of "obligations") separately in Chapters 4 through 8. Cf. David lbbetson. The
Law of Business Rome' Foundations of the Anglo-American Tort of Negligence, in 52 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS 1999, 74, 85-87 (1999) (describing the contribution of the natural law writers
to the development of the duty of care concept in modern negligence law).
19. See the summary account in STEIN, supra note 16, at 104-23, and the more comprehen-
sive one in WIMACKER, supra note 18, at 279-386. The French Civil Code does not have a separate
subdivision for obligations, but deals with both contract and delict as "Modes of Acquiring Prop-
erty," with contract receiving its own title, while delicts and quasi-delicts are addressed in a
chapter within a title on "Engagements Formed without an Agreement." THE FRENCH CIVIL
CODE (as amended to 1 July 1994) (John H. Crabb trans., 1995). For modern European code
provisions and judicial decisions representative of the category of "delict" in civil law jurisdic-
tions, see ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS FOR
THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAWv 339-464 (1957), and (a more detailed compendium) F-.
LAWSON & B.S. MARKESINIS, 2 ToRTious LIABILITY FOR UNINTENTIONAL HAM IN THE COWAON4
LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW (1982).
20. Simpson, supra note 6, at 655-57; see also MICHAEL H. HOEFLICH, ROmAN AND CIVIL
LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
16 (1997).
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American legal writers came to agree that contracts would be one
fundamental branch of the new substantive private law, and their
treatment of the subject was much influenced by civilian scholar-
ship.21 Since the civilian tradition paired tort with contract as the
two fundamental subdivisions of the law of obligations, recognition
of contract as one basic category naturally suggested that tort
should be another.
2. Common Law Commentary
As early as Bracton in the thirteenth century, English com-
mentators seized on the Roman distinction between tort and con-
tract to help classify the actions recognized by the common law. 2
2
The medieval writs of trespass on the one hand, and debt and cove-
nant on the other, could be seen as roughly corresponding to the
Roman tort and contract, and Bracton's treatment meant that from
very early on the categories of the civilian law of obligations were
available to English lawyers as a way of understanding their own
law.23
In the eighteenth century, Blackstone, the most influential
of all the English institutional writers, clearly set out the Ro-
man/civilian distinction in Book III of his Commentaries. He classi-
fied the common-law "personal actions" into those on the one hand
"founded on contract," comprising "all actions upon debt or prom-
ises," and on the other those "founded ... upon torts or wrongs...
all actions for trespasses, nuisances, assaults, defamatory words,
and the like."24
In similar terms, Holmes' own favorite basic American text-
book from his law student days, Judge Timothy Walker's intelligent
and down-to-earth Introduction to American Law, described the
category of actions for "civil injury or wrong," for which, he noted,
21. See DAVID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 220.44
(1999), for the influence of Pothier and Savigny on nineteenth century English contract theory.
As his title suggests, Ibbetson's book is a sustained account of the history of English tort and
contract law seen through the conceptual lens provided by the Roman-civilian categories.
22. HENRY DE BRATON, 2 ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 290 (Samuel E. Thorno
trans., 1968).
23. See IBBETSON, supra note 21, at 11-94, for a particularly clear account of the medieval
origins of what would become the modern law of tort and contract, seen from the perspective of
the civilian categories.
24. WILLIAM BLACiSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 117 (1768). By the
"personal actions," Blackstone meant all private civil actions at law apart from the old proprie-
tary "real" and "mixed" actions, which were already obsolescent in his time.
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"the law commonly uses the latin word delictum or the French word
tort, instead of our equally significant English words." Walker's lin-
guistic nativism did not stop him from going on to mention the Ro-
man distinction of "personal actions" into "actions ex contractu, or
actions of contract, and actions ex delicto, or actions of tort." He
classified the common law forms of action accordingly, placing debt,
covenant, and assumpsit under contract, and trespass, trover, de-
tinue, replevin, case, and ejectment under tort.25
By 1871, no serious student of English or American law
could doubt that contracts was established as one of the basic cate-
gories in the newly emerging system of substantive law. Langdells
celebrated casebook had just appeared in America,2 and over the
next few years the Pollock and Anson treatises would conclude al-
most a century of English contract scholarship by giving the subject
the familiar structure that still generally holds today-a structure
much influenced by the civilian writers Pothier and Savigny.Y With
contracts thus established, could the other half of the traditional
civilian dichotomy be far behind?
3. Positive Law
Working lawyers might ignore the refinements of Roman and
civil law, and even the categorizing efforts of their native commen-
tators,28 but they had to take account of statutes and case law that
treated the tort-contract distinction as legally operative. In a sum-
mary of the history of the distinction in English law published in
25. TIMoTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERIcAN LAW 549-60 (4th ed. 1860) (1837).
Holmes rated this "admirable" work as "the best book we know of to explain to the student the
actual bearing of legal principles upon the daily affairs of men;" it goes "to the root of the mat-
ter," asks for "the practical use of all these traditions and forms," and "those which cannot show
such a use in their favor are dismissed from consideration." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Re.
view, 3 AM. L. REV. 357, 358 (1869), reprinted in 1 WORKS, supra note 7, at 204, 205. Holmes was
still repeating his praise of Walker's book when he was in his eighties. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Introduction to the General Survey, 1 CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY SERIES (1912). re-
printed in 3 WORKS, supra note 7, at 439, 440.
26. C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS (1871). See Holmes'
favorable review of it as setting out "the whole law of contracts proper" according to a "plan...
both original and instructive." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Review, 5 AM. L. REV. 539, 540
(1871), reprinted in I WORKS, supra note 7, at 243, 243.
27. VILLIAM REYNELL ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CON'TRACT (1880); FREDERICK
POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT (1876). For an assessment of the influence of Savigny and
particularly Pothier on Pollock and Anson, see IBBETSON, supra note 21, at 220-44.
28. Holmes noted T. E. Holland's remark that "the old.fashioned English lavyer's idea of a
satisfactory body of law was a chaos with a full index." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Review, 5
AM. L. REv. 114, 114 (1870) reprinted in 1 WORKS, supra note 7, at 223, 223 (reviewing T. E.
HOLLAND, ESSAYS UPON THE FoM OF THE LAW (1870)).
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1887, Frederick William Maitland noted four areas in which it
made a practical difference in outcome whether an action was char-
acterized as sounding in tort or in contract:29
" Joinder of actions. As early as 1682, English judges were
pronouncing that "causes upon contract . . . and causes
upon tort cannot be joined."
* Survival of actions. Contract actions survived a plaintiffs
death, but tort actions did not-so a 1627 case said; and
the same distinction was sometimes (generally less
clearly) intimated with respect to whether an action sur-
vived a defendant's death.
* Joinder of parties. Joint contractors had to all be sued
jointly or the action was subject to dismissal, but tort li-
ability was joint and several, so that any one of a group of
joint tortfeasors could be sued alone for the entire dam-
age jointly caused.
* Costs. Several of the procedural reform statutes passed in
England leading up to the final abolition of the forms of
action in 1873 made the availability of costs turn on
whether the action sounded in tort or contract, and the
language of some of these statutes assumed that every
personal action was either "founded on contract" or
"founded on tort."
The same distinctions could be found in American law, including
the tendency of some early procedural reform legislation to assume
that civil actions at law sounded either in contract or tort.30
29. F.W. Maitland, Historical Note on the Classification of the Forms of Personal Action, in
FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAv OF TORTS 368-70 (1887) (App. A). For other accounts of how Eng.
lish positive law made operative distinctions between tort and contract before the establishment
of the modern categorical scheme after 1870, see J. H. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 454-55 (3d ed. 1990); IBBETSON, supra note 21, at 171-73; WINFIELD, supra note 2 at 76-
79 (1931) (also noting the doctrine that punitive damages are sometimes available in tort, but
generally not in contract).
30. See, e.g., An Act Relating to the Proceedings, Practice, and Rules of Evidence, 1852
Mass. Acts 223, § 1 (providing separate actions and proceedings for tort and contract); see also
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE ch. 3, §§ 337-40 (1872) (codifying Statutes of 1850, 343) (providing longer
limitations period for actions sounding in contract than those sounding in tort, e.g., slander and
false imprisonment); MASS. REVISED STATUTES tit. V, ch. 120, §§ 1-8 (1836) (same); N.Y. REVISED
STATUTES pt. III, ch. III, §§ 89-93 (same). See generally CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND esp. 116-17 (1897); Jeremiah
Smith, Tort and Absolute Liability-Suggested Changes in Classification, 30 HARV. L. REV. 241
(1917), reprinted in HARVARD LAW REVIEW, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 176, 177-78
(1924)).
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B. Against Torts
We now know that the lawyers who made Hilliard's and
Addison's treatises commercially successful were betting on a win-
ning horse; torts did indeed eventually establish itself as one of the
fundamental categories of Anglo-American law. Given the factors
militating in its favor, it may seem to us that things could hardly
have gone otherwise. But this is just an instance of the familiar
fallacy of hindsight determinism. The reclassification triggered by
the abolition of the writs did not have to end up with tort as one of
the basic substantive subjects.
The point is supported by the very fact that a legal scholar
as attuned to intellectual fashion as the young Holmes could reject
torts as "not a proper subject" as late as 1871. And indeed at that
point there was still much to be said against the case I have just
summarized for accepting tort as a basic category. Roman and ci-
vilian theory, the tradition of common law commentary, and the
actual positive law of England and America, taken together, still
left the matter far from concluded.
1. Roman-Civil Law vs. Analytical Jurisprudence
Holmes' fundamental objection to tort as a subject rested on
the analytical work of Jeremy Bentham, augmented in Holmes' law
student days by the publication of the jurisprudence lectures of
John Austin.3 1 Bentham had provided much of the ideological fuel
for the procedural reforms that were sweeping away the writ sys-
31. Bentham and Austin were Holmes' primary masters in legal theory, supplemented by
the insights of the historical school He thought them much superior as theorists to the Romans,
writing that "The Roman law is a priceless mass of materials for investigations like those of the
great Germans... But for the philosophy of law [Bentham's] 'Fragment on Government' and
Austin's lectures are worth the whole Corpus." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Summary of Events, 7
AM. L REV. 578, 578 (1873), reprinted in 1 VORKS, supra note 7, at 322, 323. And even the work
of the greatest of the German historicist writers, Savigny, was flawed because "the minute and
constant reference to the Roman law more or less clogs and retards the free development of prin-
ciples." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Review, 7 AM. L. REV. 320, 320 (1873), reprinted in 1
WORKS, supra note 7, at 322, 322 (reviewing ARCHIBALD BROWN, AN EPITOME AND ANALYSIS OF
SAVIGNY'S TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS IN ROlAN LAW (1872)). "It is not true that fundamental
principles are more clearly brought out in the Roman than in the English law," they were rather
"obscured" by "principles of classification which have lost their significance, and by a philosophy
which is no longer vitaL" Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Review, 7 AM. L REV. 652, 653 (1873),
reprinted in 1 WORMS, supra note 7, at 321, 321 (reviewing T. WHITCOMBE GREEN, OUrLINES OF
ROMAN LAW (1872)).
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tem in the latter years of the century.32 The same analysis that
supported the abolition of the forms of action also portrayed as in-
coherent and indefensible the Roman/civil categories of "personal
actions" and "obligations," subdivided into parallel categories of
contract and tort.
Bentham had insisted that law should be analyzed on the
basis of a firm distinction between substantive law and procedure.
This new conceptual distinction helped Bentham and Austin make
the case that English law remained intellectually and practically
incoherent because substantive legal rights and duties were learned
and classified for practice under the jumbled array of procedural
forms that had grown up over the centuries to enforce them. This
had it backwards, Bentham insisted; procedure should be designed
functionally to serve as the handmaiden of substance.33
Bentham's new substance-procedure distinction was crucial
to the legislative reforms that replaced the writ system. 34 The Field
Code in America and the English Judicature Act were premised on
the idea that a single procedural form, the "civil action," could
regulate the adjudication of all civil disputes, without altering ei-
ther the pre-existing legal rights and duties of the parties or the
relief triggered by their violation. The reforms could hardly have
been adopted unless they had been backed by the guarantee that
they would not change those elements of the existing legal order on
which people relied in their everyday lives. To give this assurance,
the reformers invoked the new Benthamite concept of substantive
law, the law that both established legal rights and duties and pro-
vided sanctions and redress for their violation. This substantive law
was the substratum left unchanged by the purely procedural re-
32. Holmes himself ascribed the procedural reforms of his day to "Bentham's ideas." Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV 652, 653 (1873) [hereinafter The Theory of
Torts], reprinted in 1 WORKs, supra note 7, at 326, 327. Austin's contribution had to wait for the
publication in 1863 by his widow Sarah of the lectures on jurisprudence he had delivered at
London University in the 1830s.
33. Principles of Judicial Procedure, supra note 10, at 6.
[T]he course of procedure ought to have in every instance, for its main and pri-
mary end at least, the accomplishment of the will manifested in the body of
substantive laws ... Of the adjective branch of the law, the only defensible ob-
ject, or say end in view, is the maximization of the execution and effect given to
the substantive branch of law.
Id.
34. See generally M.I. Zagday, Benthant on Civil Procedure, in JEREMY BENTHAM AND THE
LAW 68, 78 (George W. Keeton & Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 1948) (noting that Bentham's
works greatly influenced the procedural reforms that took place in the last ten years of his life
and that his teachings spurred Romilly, Brougham, and Denman to create Parliamentary Com-
missions to examine the law and recommend reforms).
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forms, which affected only the machinations of lawyers and judges
inside the system. The reforms were only intended to make the ma-
chinery of justice run with less delay and expense. 35
The reformers also believed that the simplified procedure
would create pressure for systematic reclassification of the law,
which would make it easier to teach and learn and more accessible
to the public. But a new arrangement of the law would not change
its substance, except insofar as a better taxonomy exposed inconsis-
tencies and anomalies to the kind of scrutiny that might lead on to
substantive reform.3 6 One of Austin's main contributions to the
analytical enterprise was his work on classification, which com-
bined Benthamite methods and ideas with civilian learning ac-
quired in the Germany of Savigny.37
The case against making torts a main department of law in
this new arrangement was that, unlike contract and property, it did
not make sense as a primary substantive category. As Holmes put
it, the "objection to the title Torts ... is that it puts the cart before
the horse, that legal liabilities are arranged with reference to the
forms of action allowed by the common law for infringing them,-
the substantive under the adjective law."38
35. See POMEROY, supra note 8, at 38 (stating that when forms of action are abolished "the
rights of action remain, and the remedies which could be recovered by the use of any particular
action may still be secured by means of the civil action which the codes have substituted in place
of all the previous forms"); Holmes, supra note 9, at 239-40.
Of course it would not be intended to change our rights, by a change in the form
of pleading. Accordingly where the present existing law gives alternative reme-
dies . . . the plaintiffs election, signified at the common law by the action
brought, would be one of the facts to be stated in the case.
Id.
36. For a good recent account of the codification movement in England and America, see
Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Coninion-Law World, 25 YALE J. IN"L
L. 435 (2000). Some reformers (Bentham, Austin, and Sir James Stephen in England; David
Dudley Field in the United States) thought the systematic rationalization of substantive law
could best be carried out through codification, while many others, including Holmes, opposed
substantive codification, arguing that the work of systematization was better left to the private
efforts of independent jurists. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the
Law, 5 AM. L. Rev. 1, 1-3 (1870) [hereinafter Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law], reprinted
in 1 WORKS, supra note 7, at 212, 212-14. The Field codification movement in New York pro-
duced not only the famous code of procedure enacted in 1848, but also a substantive civil code
completed and promulgated in 1865, which, though rejected in its home state, was enacted else-
where-for instance in California in 1872. CIVIL CODE, ANNOTATED, OF CALIFORNIA (1872); see
also Weiss, supra, at 511-13 (describing the enactment of the Field Civil Code in Georgia, North
and South Dakota, California, and Montana).
37. HOEFLICH, supra note 20, at 10-12.
38. The Theory of Torts, supra note 32, at 331. Holmes' phrasing showed that he had not
fully incorporated the Benthamite terminology-the objection to torts is not that it is a proce-
dural C'adjective") category but that it is a remedial one. Remedies are part of the substantive
law in the Benthamite (and our contemporary) scheme; we regard the question whether specific
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According to both Bentham and Austin, the core of substan-
tive law was made up of the rules establishing those legal rights
and duties that empowered and regulated the behavior of individu-
als in daily life. Auxiliary to these "primary" rights and duties, but
still within the substantive law, were the remedial or "sanctioning"
rights that arose when primary rights were violated.39 Austin ar-
gued that the substantive law should be classified according to an
arrangement of primary rights-for example, rights to personal se-
curity, liberty of movement, reputation, property, and the like.40
The remedial part of the substantive law should then be set out in a
way that manifested its character as instrumental to the primary
rights.41
Under this analysis, contract was a proper first-order legal
category, because the rights arising from enforceable agreements
formed a separate and recognizable class of primary rights, distinct
from, say, property rights, and rights of bodily integrity. Torts,
however, had no such distinctive primary subject matter. It was
made up entirely of sanctioning rights, civil claims arising out of
the violation of whatever primary rights, apart from those based on
contract, that the law happened to protect by a private civil rem-
edy.42 The two bodies of law, tort and contract, thus did not form
parallel categories at all, and the Roman-civilian division of obliga-
performance will be allowed for a class of contracts, or punitive damages for a class of torts, as
part of the substantive law of contracts and torts respectively.
39. John Austin, Outline of the Course of Lectures [hereinafter Outline], in 1 AUSTIN'S
JURISPRUDENCE 31, 43 (John Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885) (explaining distinction between pri-
mary and sanctioning rights). Bentham had himself earlier made the same distinction; he pro.
posed to state the primary rights and duties in a Civil Code, and the remedies or sanctioning
rights and duties in a Penal Code. Jeremy Bentham, General View of Complete Code of Laws
[hereinafter View of Complete Code of Laws], in 3 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 10, at
155, 160.
40. See Outline, supra note 39, at 4 (describing categorization of primary rights into Law of
Things and Law of Persons, and subcategorization of the latter into specific rights); see also John
Austin, On Law, Considered with Reference to Its Purposes [hereinafter On Law], in 2 AUSTIN'S
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 39, at 683, 773 (John Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885) (describing the
division of primary rights).
41. According to Austin, secondary or sanctioning rights are "instruments for the attain-
ment of another right," namely a primary right. On Law, supra note 40, at 763-66.
42. In the Benthamite codification scheme, civil injuries (including what we call both torts
and breaches of contract) belonged in the Penal Code. See View of Complete Code of Laws, supra
note 39, at 163-67 (identifying private offenses-acts detrimental to assignable individuals-as
one category of offences in penal code and including in this category, e.g., offenses against the
person and reputation). Contract law (meaning the substantive law by which contractual rights
and duties are determined) was in the Civil Code. Id. at 190-92. Similarly, Austin placed contract
and quasi-contract in the category of primary rights, and torts-rights to remedy arising from
delicts-in the sanctioning rights category. See Outline, supra note 39, at 53.
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tions into those arising ex contractu and ex delicto incoherently
mixed logical levels.43
Even if some fundamental legal categories-criminal law for
example-should be identified on the basis of remedies rather than
primary rights,44 torts could not reasonably be one of them. The re-
medial category parallel to criminal law would be "civil wrongs,"
including breach of contract. But tort excluded breach of contract,
while including some (though not all) of the civil protections for
property and personal rights. Nor did the primary rights and duties
whose violation were remedied by tort actions have any positive
unifying characteristic, as was shown by the negative terminology
of "apart from contract" and "other than contract" that was often
used to name the category in its early days.45
Holmes made these points as he explained why he thought
tort was "not a proper subject." Its domain, as generally understood,
included everything falling under the common law actions for tres-
pass, trespass on the case, and trover. But no meaningful common
feature united these actions, viewed as a grouping of primary rights
(or, as Holmes preferred, primary duties.)46 Trespass to land was a
tort action, but the primary rights and duties it enforced were part
of property law, and were remedied not only by tort suits but also
43. Outline, supra note 39, at 53-54.
44. For example, criminal law might be an appropriate substantive law category, not be-
cause the primary rights it protects or duties it enforces form a coherent group, but because
criminal prosecution inflicts uniquely severe sanctions, which justifies both the use of separate
procedures, and the control of this most fearful state power by general overarching substantive
principles that are designed to guard against oppression (e.g. the rule of lenity, the requirement
of mens rea.)
45. See, e.g., BISHOP, supra note 5. For a contemporary attempt to justify the common law
category "tort" as roughly equivalent to "civil wrong," see Peter Birks, The Concept of a Civil
Wrong, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw 31 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). Birks
takes note of the Austinian objection, but overrides it on the practical (but conceptually question-
begging) ground that it "drives us further and further from the categories of the law as we know
them"-which is to say from the civilian scheme with its dichotomy of contract and tort, by now
too firmly entrenched in Anglo-American legal terminology to be displaced. Id. at 47.
46. Holmes argued that the law should be classified by its primary duties, rather than
rights, as Austin generally preferred, pointing out that there were legal duties without corre-
sponding rights (duties of military service, or to pay taxes), but no legal rights without corre-
sponding duties. See Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, supra note 36, at 214; Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Arrangement of the Law---Privity, 7 AM. L REV. 46, 46 (1872), reprinted in
1 WORKS, supra note 7, at 303. Holmes later abandoned his project of devising a universal legal
taxonomy (whether of duties or rights); he decided that historical accident played so large a part
in shaping even the broad outlines of each legal system that no scheme for classifying substan-
tive doctrine across all systems could be fruitful See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. I REV. 457, 475 (1897) [hereinafter The Path of the Law], reprinted in 3 WORKS,
supra note 7, at 391, 403 (arguing that the pursuit of a "useless quintessence of all systems"
should be replaced by the more limited but practical project of achieving "an accurate anatomy of
one").
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by the old real and mixed actions, which lay outside the "law of ob-
ligations" altogether. Another tort action, assault and battery, en-
forced the rights and duties of bodily security, a primary category
distinct from property. Another tort, deceit, addressed a third dis-
tinct set of primary duties, those involving fraud; and these duties
were further enforced, entirely outside of tort law, by the equitable
doctrine of promissory estoppel. Finally, the tort of seduction en-
forced a class primary rights and duties that belonged "at the other
end of the corpus juris"-as part of the law of persons, governing
status and domestic relations.47 Viewed from the perspective of the
classification of primary rights or duties, the category of tort was
thus entirely incoherent.
The critique of torts as a category was further strengthened
by consideration of its relation to criminal law. The Roman-civilian
taxonomy discouraged this comparison by making the distinction
between private and public law fundamental, placing criminal law
in the "public" category, and then focusing juristic science entirely
upon private law.48 Austin attacked both elements, the initial sepa-
ration of public from private law, and the assignment of crimes to
the public law side. This obscured the close relation between crimi-
nal and civil remedies in the enforcement of the primary individual
rights to life, liberty, and property.4 9 Most crimes (the ones that
have victims) are also torts.
47. Here Holmes was following Austin, who had argued that the civilian category "law of
persons," should not head the corpus juris as it did in Roman law, but should be subordinated as
a set of exceptions to the ordinary law C'law of things") that established the presumptively equal
rights and duties of mature adults in a liberal society. See Outline, supra note 39, at 41.42, 364.
Austin subclassified the law of things into rights in personan, basically contract and quasi-
contract rights, which ran against assignable individuals, and rights in ren, the bulk of legal
rights-those to property, bodily security, liberty of movement, and reputation-which ran
against all the world. See id. at 45, 371-74. Thus the cases involving trespass to land, assault and
battery, and deceit, would each come under separate subdivisions of the law of things, while
seduction would belong to the law of persons.
48. Bentham grouped civil and criminal sanctions together in his Penal Code and defined
primary rights of property, bodily security, and so on, in his Civil Code. View of Complete Code of
Laws, supra note 39, at 160. The Roman law of delict involved an explicitly penal element that is
absent in the common law of torts, though allowance of punitive damages shrinks the gap; see
NICHOLAS, supra note 17, at 207-09. When modern writers have wanted to discuss crime under
the Roman classificatory scheme they have often followed Sir Henry Maine, who considered
"Delict and Crime" together in a single chapter of HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 367
(1861). I am told by Professor George Fletcher that today criminal law is classified as private law
in France, and as a separate category intermediate between private and public in Germany.
49. See Outline, supra note 39, at 67-69; see also John Austin, Analysis of Pervading Notions
[hereinafter Analysis of Pervading Notions], in I AUSTIN'S JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 39, at
343, 404 ('All offences affect the community, and all offences affect individuals."). Austin substi-
tuted the term "political law" for the Roman-civil "public law," treating it as the creation of spe-
cial status for public officials, hence classified under the law of persons, which in turn was the
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The actual law of remedies and sanctions in modern legal
systems reveals every imaginable mix of public prosecution and
private civil suit, along with such remedial hybrids as private
prosecution, public regulatory enforcement using civil penalties,
private rights to initiate public regulatory action, civil suits by pri-
vate attorneys general, and the award of punitive damages in pri-
vate civil suits, paid either to private plaintiffs or to the state.50 The
decision how to blend these remedies in enforcing primary rights or
duties is an instrumental one to be made on shifting grounds of ex-
pediency, even if criminal punishment itself is limited in principle
to serious moral wrongdoing.51 So the line between tort and crime
even regarded as remedial categories is blurred, and in any event
no basis appears for treating tort as a category of substantive law.
One explanation for the confused legacy of the civilian cate-
gorical scheme was the failure of Roman jurists to develop the ab-
stract concept of a legal right with correlative duties. As a result,
they could not see tort and criminal law as providing different
remedies for a largely overlapping set of rights and duties. Simi-
larly, the failure to think in terms of rights and duties obscured the
disparate nature of the substantive claims protected by delictual
actions.
By contrast, the modern civilian writers well understood the
idea of a legal right. For them it linked law to social-contract politi-
catch-all category of exceptions to the general law that established the rights and duties of le-
gally equal individuals. See Outline, supra note 39, at 68. Bentham similarly gave separate
treatment to the law governing the structure and powers of government in his Constitutional
Code.
50. The modern American law governing when tort actions should be implied from, or pre-
empted by, regulatory statutes gives an ongoing practical demonstration of the "mix of remedies"
approach to public regulation and private action. See generally Richard B. Stewart & Cass R_
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L REV. 1193 (1982).
51. Neither Bentham nor Austin made a sharp distinction in principle between civil and
criminal sanctions. See Analysis of Pervading Notions, supra note 49, at 343, 501. Bentham did
distinguish between punitive and "satisfactive" remedies, see Specimen ofa Penal Code, in 1 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 165, and Austin followed him in describing
criminal punishment as having a purely deterrent function, while civil remedies had the dual
functions of prevention and reparation. Analysis of Pervading Notions, supra note 49, at 503-04.
Some contemporary functionalist writers have urged sharpening the distinction between tort and
crime to maintain the admonitory uses of the criminal law. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful'
Mean "Criminal'?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71
B.U. L. REv. 193, 193-04 (1991) ("Characteristically, tort law prices, while criminal law prohib-
its."); Henry MK Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTE.p. PROBS. 401, 404-
05 (1958). Others have tended to treat criminal punishment and civil damages together under a
unified theory of deterrent sanctions. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the
Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1201-05 (1985); see also MARK KEL1,1AN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 25-32, 88-99 (1987) (critiquing attempts to distinguish criminal pun-
ishment in principle from civil regulation).
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cal theory, which appealed to the uncertainty and insecurity of in-
dividual natural rights in the state of nature to justify the estab-
lishment of a government empowered to define those rights by law
and enforce them by regular sanctions and remedies. But the mod-
ern civilians generally did not escape the effects of the original Ro-
man segregation of criminal law into the (thereafter largely ig-
nored) category of public law. They continued to follow the Romans
in portraying delict as a distinct body of obligations parallel to con-
tract, rather than as the catch-all miscellany modern analytical ju-
risprudence showed it to be.52
2. Common Law Commentary
Roman and civil law aside, what to make of the place of the
category "tort" in the work of common-law commentators? Writers
from Bracton to Blackstone to Holmes' own favorite Judge Walker
of Ohio seemed to have endorsed and sanctified the civilian distinc-
tion between contract and tort. Yet on this matter appearances
were deceiving; tort was not yet really an established subject in the
common law. And the civilian concepts of "personal actions" and
"law of obligations," which paired tort with contract, had never be-
come serious working categories for the leading common-law text
writers. Hence the recognition of contract as a fundamental de-
partment of substantive law by 1870 did not entail the acceptance
of tort as well.
While Bracton, Blackstone (and the good Judge Walker too)
all stated the civilian contract-tort distinction, they did so only in
passing. No common law commentator treated the distinction as a
significant structural classifying device, or made tort a significant
subject for independent analysis. Both tort itself, and the tort-
contract distinction, were entirely absent from a number of the
most important general treatises on the common law as a whole-
Sir Edward Coke's Institutes of the Law of England, Sir Henry
Finch's Law, Sir Matthew Hale's Analysis of the Law of England,
and even (as late as the first half of the nineteenth century) James
Kent's Commentaries on American Law.
52. "Delict," while structurally parallel to contract in civilian theory, was not an important
category in practice in the civil law until the upsurge of accidental injuries associated with the
Industrial Revolution-only a few pages in POTHIER, A TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS CONSIDERED
IN A MORAL AND LEGAL VIEW 73-76 (Francois Xavier Martin trans., 1999), and only five sections
of the French Civil Code of 1804, THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE, supra note 19, at art. 1382-86, wero
devoted to the subject, by comparison to much richer treatments of contract.
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Holmes spent several years of his early career annotating
Kent, so the Chancellor's treatment is particularly worth noting in
this respect. The reader searches in vain through the 2000-plus
pages of his Commentaries looking for treatment of anything re-
sembling our category of tort law. There are ten pages on the law of
defamation, but this comes under the category-rights of persons,"
subdivision "right to reputation"-and Kent treats libel indiffer-
ently as both a crime and a tort. A single sentence in the section on
the personal right to bodily security can be taken as, in effect, the
whole of Kent on Torts: "If violence has been actually offered, the
offender is not only liable to be prosecuted and punished on behalf
of the state, but he is bound to render to the party aggrieved ade-
quate compensation in damages."5 3 Kent analyzed private law in
terms of what Austin would call primary rights, and as with Black-
stone, his basic distinction was between personal and property
rights. In such a scheme, tort finds no structural place.
In contrast to Kent, Blackstone did clearly articulate the ci-
vilian tort-contract distinction, in a passage earlier quoted.r But
neither that distinction nor the category "tort" itself played a struc-
tural role in his analysis. Blackstone's great influence makes it im-
portant to see this, lest we think that acceptance of tort as a basic
subject naturally followed from his treatment of the subject. The
point can only be understood when his discussion of tort is placed in
the context of his work as a whole.
Blackstone's Commentaries were published in four books, en-
titled "Rights of Persons," "Rights of Things," "Private Wrongs," and
"Public Wrongs." These headings superficially tracked the Roman
categories, 55 so that it might seem that Book 4 dealt with public
law, and Books 1-3 with the standard subdivisions of private law-
law of persons, of things, and of actions.56
53. JAMES KENT, 2 COMMEENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 15 (Oliver Wendell Holmes ed., 12th
ed. 1873).
54. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
55. See ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAV 166-81 (1991) (noting parallels
between Blackstone's structure and the similar four-book organization of Justinian's Institutes).
Though Watson argues that Blackstone's structure was more influenced by Justinian's than has
previously been recognized, he does not claim that Blackstone incorporated the Roman "law of
obligations" with its tort-contract dichotomy into his organization. Another celebrated study of
Blackstone's scheme largely ignores the influence of the Roman institutional ordering, empha-
sizing ideological factors-the need to mediate between liberal and pre-liberal features of eight-
eenth century English law. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28
BUFF. L REV. 205 (1979).
56. The Blackstonian title phrases "Rights of Persons" and "Rights of Things" are mis-
translations of the Roman jus personarunt and jus reruni, law of persons and law of things.
Blackstone inherited the terminology (along with much else) from SIR MATTHEW HALE, ANALYSIS
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Below the surface level marked by the titles, however, the
Blackstonian scheme departed substantially from any Roman mod-
els. Book 1 on the "Rights of Persons" did deal with topics such as
husband and wife, master and servant, and guardian and ward,
which as matters of ascriptive status would have fallen under the
Roman law of persons. As its title suggests, however, Book 1 also
contained Blackstone's formulation of the modern "absolute rights
of individuals," the natural rights to life, liberty, property, and per-
sonal security, concepts that had no parallel in Roman law. Fur-
ther, Blackstone placed his account of the British Constitution
(public law to the Romans) in Book 1 as part of the law of persons,
treating the powers of government officers as grants of a special
kind of legal status.57
Book 2, "Rights of Things," contained Blackstone's detailed
treatment of English property law. It can be seen to (very roughly)
follow the order of the Roman subdivision of the "law of things" into
subcategories of property, successions, and obligations. In the part
corresponding to "obligations," Blackstone discussed "things per-
sonal, or chattels," and included a chapter devoted to contracts. He
treated contract, however, not as a form of obligation parallel to
tort, but as one among several modes of gaining or losing title to
personal property, along with forfeiture, grant, and marriage. And
there was nothing in Book 2 that corresponded to the delictual half
of the Roman/civilian law of obligations.
Book 4, "Public Wrongs," was a detailed treatment of English
criminal law and procedure. (Recall that by contrast the Romans
treated criminal law as public law, and therefore not an important
focus of juristic science.) The rest of Blackstone's quite extensive
treatment of English public law, the body of law governing the
OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 1 (1716) ("Now all Civil Rights or Interests are of Two Sorts: 1. Jura
Personarun, or Rights of Persons. 2. Jura Rerurn, or Rights of Things."). The Romans had no
abstract concept of an individual C'subjective") right, for which the law then provided a remedy;
rather the individual simply had an "action." NICHOLAS, supra note 17, at 100 n.1. The dichot-
omy of right and remedy is post-medieval, and our familiar conceptual triad of right, remedy,
and procedure dates only from the nineteenth century.
57. Austin, who rarely had a good word for Blackstone, did praise him for his insight that
public law in this narrow sense (which Austin called "political law") should be classified as a part
of the law of status. See Outline, supra note 39, at 69; see also supra note 47. As Austin noted,
Blackstone was here (as elsewhere) following the structure laid down in Sir Matthew Halo's
Analysis of the Law of England, supra note 56, at 4-6. Dicey's famous notion that the Rule of Law
rejects "administrative law," the grant of special legal powers to officials who are then safe-
guarded by immunity from personal suit, is prefigured by Austin's placement (following Black-
stone and Hale) of public law under the category, suspect for its illiberal connotations, of the law
of persons. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 120-21
(Liberty Classics ed., 1982) (1889).
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structure of the state and the powers of officials, appeared, as pre-
viously noted, in Book 1.
It was in Book 3, "Private Wrongs," roughly corresponding to
the Roman "law of actions," that Blackstone stated the civilian dis-
tinctions between real (proprietary) and personal actions, and then
distinguished personal actions into those in tort and contract re-
spectively.58 Here we might expect to find an account of something
like the Roman law of obligations, but in fact there is nothing of the
kind. As already noted, Blackstone had already treated contract law
in Book 2, as a mode of acquiring property. Book 3 was entirely or-
ganized around remedies and procedure, with nothing approximat-
ing a unified treatment of tort law. It dealt successively with modes
of relief, the system of courts, the common law forms of action, and
finally pleading and practice (roughly our civil procedure).
Blackstone's statement of the distinction between tort and
contract came in passing as part of the discussion of the forms of
action in Chapter 8, entitled "Of Wrongs and of Remedies, Re-
specting the Rights of Persons." The distinction played no struc-
tural role even in that chapter, much less in the larger structure of
Book 3 or the Commentaries as a whole. Blackstone classified Chap-
ter 8 around the "absolute rights of persons" he had originally listed
in Book 1. Among these, for example, was the right of personal lib-
erty, and he listed as remedies available for its protection both the
(private law) damage suit for false imprisonment and the (public
law) writ of habeas corpus. Clearly Blackstone's concept of "private
wrongs" was not limited to what civilians would classify under the
law of obligations, or even under private law. He gave no separate
consideration to delict or tort as a legal category.
Like Blackstone, Walker stated the tort-contract distinction,
and classified the common law writs under its headings.59 But also
like Blackstone, he made no structural use of the distinction, nor
did the concepts of "obligation" or "personal action" or "tort" do any
conceptual work in his treatise. His primary divisions were consti-
tutional law, law of persons, 60 law of property (with contracts
treated as a subdivision), law of crimes, law of procedure, and in-
ternational law. The tort-contract distinction made its brief appear-
58. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
59. WALKER, supra note 25. I am using the fourth edition of Walker's book (1860), the one
Holmes would have used. Its text conformed to Walker's third edition (1855); the latter was
substantially revised from his first edition (1837).
60. Id. at 226-95. The law of persons comprised domestic relations, master and servant, and
executors and administrators, tracking the Roman idea of status-based law.
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ance in a section on "classification of actions" in the division on pro-
cedure, which catalogued the traditional common-law actions.
Walker (an active procedural reformer in Ohio)61 criticized
the system of forms of action as arbitrary, and went on to rede-
scribe the civil causes of action in substantive terms. But in doing
so he did not make use of the tort-contract distinction; rather, like
Blackstone, he classified causes of action by the rights they pro-
tected-bodily security, liberty, health, reputation, domestic com-
fort, and property. In listing remedies for these wrongs he confined
himself to what we would describe as tort causes of action,6 2 but he
did not use the term "tort," or refer back to his earlier discussion of
"obligation" or to the tort-contract distinction. He described con-
tract actions not as forming a separate legal category, but rather as
vindicating a species of "personal property," namely "things in ac-
tion."63 Finally, Walker distinguished civil from criminal law on the
ground that wrongs "of a more atrocious character than ordinary"
were "punished as crimes." 64
Let me sum up. As of 1871, Holmes had not and could not
have read any commentator on the common law as a whole, or on
either English law or American law as a whole, who made any prac-
tical use of the civil law categories "law of obligations" or "personal
actions." And neither in name nor in concept was "tort" or "delict"
part of the working conceptual structure used by any of these writ-
ers.
3. Positive Law
I previously noted Maitland's 1886 survey of the features of
late nineteenth century English statute and case law that relied on
the tort-contract distinction. But I left out his conclusion, which
was that the collective effect of these doctrines was so slight that
"the courts of the present day are very free to consider the classifi-
cation of causes of action without paying much regard" to the tort-
contract dichotomy. 65 Maitland judged the recurring attempt to fit
61. See id. at 543. Note (a) (added to his third edition in 1855) describes the recently en-
acted procedural reforms in Ohio (which had followed New York) and other states, as well as
Walker's own earlier efforts along these lines in Ohio.
62. Thus Walker did not follow Blackstone in listing habeas corpus alongside the tort suit
for false imprisonment as a remedy protecting personal liberty.
63. WALKER, supra note 25, at 567.
64. Id. at 561.
65. See POLLOCK, supra note 29, at 370 (App. A).
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"the now obsolete forms of action" into the civilian classification as
"never important or very successful" and "foredoomed to failure."66
In his view, the rules about joinder of parties and joinder and sur-
vival of actions were neither firmly grounded nor hard and fast, and
the recent statutory provisions that made awards of costs turn on
whether actions sounded in tort or contract were ill-advised, but
insignificant.
In addition to the factors noted by Maitland, many features
of the common law as it had grown up over the centuries created
difficulties for any effort to segregate its private law doctrines into
the civilian categories of tort and contract. For accidental proce-
dural reasons, the main common law action for breach of contract,
assumpsit, had developed out of the writ of trespass on the case,
which was also the basis of most of the tort actions.67 The essential
allegation of an "undertaking" (super se assumpsit) could readily be
construed either as claiming a promise, which then became a bind-
ing contract with the giving of consideration, or as charging the de-
fendant with the kind of expectation-altering causal intervention in
the plaintiffs affairs that gave rise to a duty of care in tort. This
left large bodies of law arbitrarily classifiable as either contract or
tort.6 8 The liabilities of bailees for accidental damage to property,9
and of persons in the common callings for malpractice, 70 were like-
wise hard to disentangle in this respect, as were the liabilities of
masters to servants for workplace injuries,71 and the warranty li-
abilities of sellers of goods. 72
There were other difficulties with classifying English law
under the categories of the civilian law of obligations. What, for ex-
ample, was to be done with trusts and fiduciary obligations in Eq-
uity,73 and with other bodies of law (like Admiralty, with its con-
66. Id.
67. An excellent retelling of this oft-told tale, incorporating the latest learning, is IBBEETON,
supra note 21, at 126-51.
68. POLLOCK supra note 29, at 431-32.
69. See generally Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Cornnon.Law Background of Nineteenth-Cen-
tury Tort Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1132-34 (1990).
70. BAKER, supra note 29, at 471.
71. Thus Chief Justice Shaw's famous formulation of the fellow servant rule in FartreU v.
Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. 49, 53-57 (1842), was based on his characterization of
the question of the master's vicarious liability for negligent personal injury to the servant as
based on contract rather than on tort.
72. IBBETSON, supra note 21, at 223.
73. See Jeffrey Hackney, More than a Trace of the Old Philosophy, in THE CLASSIFICATION
OF OBLIGATIONS 123, 130-31 and passin (Peter Birks ed., 1997), who makes the point that the
attempt to classify English law according to the civilian scheme of obligations means slighting
the importance of the law of trusts, and other equitable doctrines.
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cepts of salvage, and maintenance and cure) that had grown up out-
side the common law courts? In his own torts treatise, Pollock wrote
that the attempt to classify personal actions as arising either in
contract or tort could not "be defended as a scientific dichotomy"
and that the civilian distinction made for "considerable perplexity"
in the extensive "intersection between the two regions. '7 4
To summarize, nothing in English law as Maitland reported
it required lawyers and judges to adopt torts as a basic category of
substantive law. And the ambiguous character of large bodies of
important doctrine counseled against any program of sorting civil
claims into categories of contract and tort. In neither respect was
American law significantly different. As a result, Holmes was not
defying well-established doctrine or deeply-rooted precedent, or ig-
noring practical necessity, when he concluded in 1871 that torts
was "not a proper subject for a law book."
4. An Alternative Arrangement
It is one thing to reject the category of torts or the tort-
contract dichotomy in theory; it is something else to supply a work-
able alternative scheme of categories. As I have noted, at the time
Holmes rejected torts as a subject, he was himself pursuing the
Bentham-Austin project of attempting to formulate a universally
applicable classification of substantive law around abstract types of
legal duties (those of all to all, of some to some, etc.) Yet two years
later, when he came to write "The Theory of Torts," he was on the
verge of deciding that the historicity (what we would call path-
dependence) of systems of law meant that no general substantive
classification along the lines laid down by Bentham and Austin was
practicable.7 5 This decision might have led Holmes to conclude that,
whatever the abstract merits of the analytical critique of tort, any
practical taxonomy of Anglo-American substantive law had to in-
clude it as a primary category.
But in fact, shortly before he rejected torts as a subject in
1871, Holmes had already come across a proposal that seemed to
meet this practical objection. John Norton Pomeroy was, like
Holmes himself, one of the younger generation of scientifically
minded American legal scholars who had been inspired to take on
74. POLLOCK, supra note 29, at 431-32.
75. See supra note 46. Holmes half-heartedly continued his project of a general classifica-
tion of duties in The Theory of Torts, supra note 32, at 331-34, and then abandoned it for good.
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the challenges posed by the abolition of the writ system.76 In 1864,
he produced an entirely plausible and detailed systematic taxonomy
of the substantive law that treated property and contract as fun-
damental categories, and yet managed very well without tort.
Pomeroy's Introduction to Municipal Law7 7 was advertised
as a general textbook for high-school and university students. The
book was in fact an impressively sophisticated introduction to the
philosophy and history of law, to comparative law (by way of an ac-
count of Roman as compared to common law), and to the legal insti-
tutions and the main outlines of the substantive law of England
and the United States. We know that Holmes read Pomeroy's book
in the spring of 1871, around the time he pronounced torts to be
"not a proper subject."78
For our purposes, the interest of Pomeroy's book resides in
its last part, his systematic exposition of substantive law. He di-
vided his analysis into three main chapters, on persons and per-
sonal rights, property, and contracts respectively.79 The latter two
chapters treated their subjects in terms that would be familiar to
any present-day lawyer. Indeed, Pomeroy sealed his his claim to
modernity by promoting contracts from a subdivision of the law of
property (as in Blackstone, Kent, and Walker) to independent cate-
gorical status.
The ideas behind Pomeroy's first chapter, on persons and
personal rights, however, are less accessible to us today. The chap-
ter was divided into sections treating "general" and "peculiar"
76. Pomeroy (1828-1885) had a distinguished career, most of it spent as the leading member
of the faculty at the University of California's first law school, Hastings College of the Law. His
writings on jurisprudence, constitutional law, water law, equity, and the reformed civil proce-
dure, were recognized as authoritative in his day. A good analysis of his work, with a biographi-
cal sketch, is THOMAiS G. BARNES, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW: THE FIRST CENTURY 88-116
(1978). See also Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought,
1990 Wis. I, REv. 1431, 1453-85; HOEFLICH, supra note 20, at 97-101.
77. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MUNICIPAl LAW (1864). Pomeroy meant
"municipal law" in its jurisprudential sense, as the internal law of a nation-state, to be con-
trasted with international law, a subject on which he wrote separately. Id. at 1.
78. Eleanor Little, The Early Reading of Justice OliLtr Wendell Holmes, 8 HARV. LIBR.
BULL. 163, 183 (1954). G. Edward White drew attention to Holmes' reading of Pomeroy's book in
his biography, and speculated that Pomeroy might have influenced the jurisprudential views
Holmes would express in The Conmnn Law (1881). G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES: LAWV AND THE INNER SELF 524 n.13 (1993). Both Pomeroy and Holmes exem-
plified the influence on younger American legal scholars of the German historical school, with its
tendency to combine conceptualist jurisprudence and historical study.
79. POMEROY, supra note 77, at 358-544 (§§ 622-917) (Part MI, entitled Outlines of Ameri-
can Municipal Law).
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rights, 80 the latter dealing with status-based doctrines correspond-
ing to the Roman category of the law of persons, such as the com-
mon law of domestic relations, and of master and servant.8 1 This
was the law governing the household and other feudal remnants,
designated "peculiar" because it was thought to be withering away
under society's progressive evolution from status to contract. 82
It was in the first section, on the general rights of persons,
that we find Pomeroy's well-concealed treatment of what we call the
law of tort. He did not analyze torts as a separate body of substan-
tive law, but included civil suits for damages along with constitu-
tional restrictions on the legislature, 83 and bits of administrative
and criminal law, as the remedies protecting the basic primary
rights.84 These primary general rights were distinguished into po-
litical rights like the suffrage, and the civil rights presumptively
applicable to all persons.
Pomeroy's civil rights (like Blackstone's "absolute rights" of
persons in Book 1 of his Commentaries) were roughly the standard
natural rights of liberal theory: personal security, subdivided into
rights to life, body and limb, and reputation; the right to personal
liberty; the rights to acquire and enjoy private property; and finally
the right of religious belief and worship.8 5 Under each right,
Pomeroy catalogued the remedies, prominently including tort
causes of action-but also constitutional immunities, and with a
miscellany of self-help privileges, extraordinary writs, and criminal
prohibitions 86 thrown in.8 7
Thus like Blackstone, Pomeroy treated the tort action for
false imprisonment and the writ of habeas corpus together as reme-
80. Id. at 358-454 (§§ 622-776) (Part III, Chapter I: Persons and Personal Rights) is divided
into "persons generally, and [their] rights and dutie[s]," and "some particular classes of persons,
and their peculiar rights and duties."
81. Id. at 429-54 (§§ 733-76).
82. MAINE, supra note 48, at 170.
83. See, e.g., POMEROY, supra note 77, at 392 (§ 676) (describing the "right of religious belief
and worship"). Pomeroy deals with the structure of legal institutions in an earlier part of his
book that is entirely separate from his exposition of the substantive law. Id. at 28-213 (§§ 56-
355).
84. See, e.g., id. at 367 (§ 636) (describing the right of self-defense as an aspect of the right
of personal security).
85. Id. at 366-91 (§§ 634-75).
86. Pomeroy explicitly omitted any extensive treatment of criminal law in his book, on the
ground that "its rules are generally based upon statutes, and are therefore very different in the
several States." Id. at xv (Preface to the First Edition).
87. See, e.g., id. at 377-82 (§ 653-58) (describing how the right of personal liberty may be en-
forced).
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dies protecting the right of personal liberty.ss Under the right of
property, Pomeroy joined civil suits for damages and specific relief
with constitutional limitations on taxation and eminent domain.8
Under the right to security of "body and limb," he described the
constitutional immunity against cruel and unusual punishments,
the criminal prohibition of mayhem, the privilege of self-defense
against attack, and the civil damages available through tort actions
for trespass and trespass on the case.90
While this arrangement recalled Blackstone, Pomeroy's
treatment was actually more consistent with the modernizing spirit
of Bentham and Austin.91 Pomeroy's classification of substantive
law was based upon primary rights, and unlike Blackstone he
grouped remedies (Austin's "sanctioning rights") under primary
substantive categories. 92 As a result, torts (a purely remedial cate-
gory) formed no part of his conceptual structure. The common-law
actions under the writs of trespass, trespass on the case, and trover
were not treated together, but broken up and distributed as civil
remedies enforcing the distinct primary rights to personal security,
property, reputation, and the like.
As noted, Pomeroy showed his modernity, and further dis-
tinguished himself from the older Blackstone-Kent tradition, by
treating contracts as a primary category of substantive law, equal
in status to property. But the civilian division of "obligations" into
contract and delict did not lead him to conclude that if contracts
was a basic category, torts must be one as well. His book thus pro-
vided Holmes with a practical demonstration that torts was not a
88. See id.
89. Id. at 388-91 (§§ 670-75).
90. Id. at 368-69 (§§ 638-40).
91. Pomeroy did not mention Austin, and dated the Preface to his first edition December 22,
1863; Austin's Lectures on Jurisprudence were published earlier that year. The spirit of analyti-
cal jurisprudence, with its central distinction between the law that is (expository jurisprudence)
and the law that ought to be (censorial jurisprudence) can be seen in Pomeroy's criticism of
Blackstone's definition of law in terms of "right[ ] and... wrong" as "either tautological or incor-
rect," POMEROY, supra note 77, at 10-11 (§§ 16-18), and his account of the common law as having
been "enacted" by the judges, id. at 20. In the preface to the 1883 edition of Mfunicipal Low,
Pomeroy praised Austin as a "profoundly able and scholarly jurist," while claiming to have him-
self given a better account of common law adjudication. Id. at vii. See also id. at 19-20 (§§ 38-39),
23-26 (§§ 51-54), for his account of the quasi-legislative powers of common law judges. At the
same time, Pomeroy expressed allegiance to traditional natural law thinking as the best guide to
what the law ought to be. Id. at 7-8 @ 11).
92. Pomeroy integrated the remedies enforcing individual rights with the rights themselves,
whereas Blackstone had separated rights (Book 1) from remedies (Book 3). Both property and
contracts, Pomeroy's other two basic divisions of law apart from "persons and personal rights"
are proper legal subjects on Austinian principles, with each organized around a distinctive do-
main of "primary rights."
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necessary component in a systematic and up-to-date account of the
substantive law. An alternative categorical scheme, organized in
good Austinian fashion around "primary rights," was entirely feasi-
ble.
III. THE STRUCTURE AND DOMAIN OF TORT LAW
Two years after declaring tort law not a proper subject,
Holmes published "The Theory of Torts." It was the first serious
attempt in the common law world to give torts both a coherent
structure and a distinctive substantive domain. Though he would
both amplify and modify his account in later and better-known
writings,9 3 the essential elements of "Holmes on Torts" can be found
in this remarkable 1873 article. Let me first summarize the main
features of the account, and then show how the theory arose from
his struggle to overcome the difficulties that had earlier led him to
reject torts as a substantive category.
The central features of Holmes' account of torts, all of which
remain influential to this day, were these:
* his account of negligence as conduct falling below the
community's standard of reasonable care, with the de-
termination of that standard treated as a question of law,
but one usually involving the identification of social
norms, and so a matter on which the judge could properly
-take the advice of the jury;
* the related idea that judges and other lawmakers have
discretion to treat the requirement of due care either as a
standard to be used in deciding individual cases, or as a
principle to be specified into more particularized and de-
terminate rules-with the consequence that many rules
which make no reference to negligence or due care are
nonetheless properly interpreted as falling under the
negligence principle;
93. Holmes' other primary writings on torts are his article Trespass and Negligence, 14 AM.
L. REV. 1 (1880), reprinted in 3 WORKS, supra note 7, at 76; his treatment of the subject in THE
COMMON LAW, supra note 78, primarily Chapters 3 and 4; and his article Privilege, Malice, and
Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894), reprinted in 3 WORKS, supra note 7, at 371. Important supple-
mentary aspects of his theory are found in the brief but significant passages on tort law in The
Path of the Law, supra note 46, and Law in Science, supra note 7; and his concurring opinion in
Arizona Employers'Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 431 (1919). I am working on a full-scale study
of Holmes' treatment of torts; here I summarize some of the conclusions of that study.
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* the placement of liability for negligence at the doctrinal
and practical center of the law of torts, covering "the
great mass of cases;194
* the division of tort law into three parts: intentional, neg-
ligence-based, the strict liability-with intentional and
strict-liability torts treated as categories peripheral and
subordinate to the central principle of liability for negli-
gence;
* the idea that a plaintiff creates prima facie liability in
tort by showing that the defendant has harmed him, and
so does not have to show violation of an independently
existing legal right or duty;
* the related idea of torts as a body of substantive law
formed by the active accommodation of conflicting consid-
erations of policy, in particular the prevention of harm,
and the freedom to engage in valued activity-by contrast
to the remedial conception of torts as the provision of
compensatory damages for the breach of rights and duties
found elsewhere in the law;
* the idea that the modern form of strict liability in tort re-
dresses injuries caused by persons engaging in "extra-
hazardous" activities,9 5 who for reasons of policy are re-
quired to insure the safety of those they foreseeably
harm.
Holmes' great breakthrough, the innovation that allowed
him to treat torts as a "proper subject" after all, was his decision to
organize tort law around the principle of liability for negligence.
That principle gave torts a conceptual and doctrinal center, and im-
plicitly designated its distinctive substantive domain as accidental
injuries. With its own principle and subject matter, torts could
overcome the difficulties that analytical jurisprudence placed in the
way of making it a fundamental legal category. But before this
could happen, Holmes had to do a good deal of work on the legal
concept of negligence.
A. Negligence: The Background
Negligence was becoming a subject of increasing practical
importance around the time Holmes wrote "The Theory of Torts."
The spread of factories, railroads, streetcars, and other technologi-
94. The Theory of Torts, supra note 32, at 327.
95. Id. at 326-27.
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cal innovations, and the associated rise in accidental injuries,
meant that a good number of lawyers were making their living in
whole or in part by bringing or defending negligence suits.96 The
growth in personal injury litigation had made negligence an ap-
pealing subject to commercial legal publishers, and the first treatise
on the subject, by the Americans Thomas Shearman and Amasa
Redfield, appeared in 1869, followed by two English monographs, by
Robert Campbell and Thomas Saunders respectively, in 1871. The
distinguished American legal writer Francis Wharton had also
turned his attention to the subject, and his magisterial scholarly
treatise appeared in 1874.
Unlike these more practical commentators, Holmes gave no
indication that he was responding to the growth of negligence liti-
gation in "The Theory of Torts." What motivated him to bring negli-
gence to the center of tort law was neither a desire to sell books nor
a practical concern about how the law should deal with accidental
injuries. His ambition was rather to advance the project of devel-
oping a general conceptual map of the substantive law.
The conduct giving rise to negligence suits was a domain of
"wrongs" that could be separated conceptually from breaches of con-
tract, that did not involve invasions of property rights, and that
were distinct from the more serious forms of wrongdoing that
formed the primary focus of the criminal law.97 Here was a piece of
the legal map that needed a label, and the concept of tort, tradi-
tional in civil law and increasingly popular with common lawyers,
seemed to fit it. What had to be worked out was the relationship
between negligence and tort law.
Negligence was and remains a confusingly protean concept
in the law, with at least three standard meanings, arising from two
distinctions. First, it is a tort cause of action, whose conventional
96. Both the upsurge in accidental injuries and the corresponding growth of a personal in.jury bar around this time are documented, with a thorough discussion of the measurement diffi-
culties and controversies, in John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of Anterican Accident Law:
Classical Tort Law and the Growth of the First-Party Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV.
690, 713-22, 758-66 (2001). For a lucid statement of how new technology often produces more
accidents (and more accidents that the law will properly judge to be caused by negligence, how.
ever socially advantageous the new technology may be), see Mark Grady, Why Are People Negli-
gent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L.
REV. 293 (1988).
97. Pomeroy had already identified property and contract as categories of substantive law
properly justified by Austinian criteria. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82. Walker had
offered a practical definition of crimes as the "more atrocious" of the class of legal wrongs, with
their "atrocity" distinguishing them from the civil wrongs as a group. See supra text accompa-
nying note 64.
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elements are (1) a duty of due care toward the plaintiff, (2) breach
of that duty, (3) causing (4) injury to the plaintiff, with plaintiffs
negligence either a defense or a factor reducing damages. This
"cause-of-action" meaning, specific to tort law, is distinguishable
from negligence as an element in a variety of civil actions and
crimes, generally connoting the lowest legally cognizable level of
fault. Negligence in this latter sense supplies the breach element of
the negligence cause of action, and hence metonymically gives its
name to the tort.
A second distinction then separates two competing versions
of the "element" aspect of negligence-the "mental state" and the
"conduct" versions. As an element, negligence might mean careless-
ness, a state of mind involving culpable inadvertence toward risk,
or it might simply mean conduct that (irrespective of state of mind)
was somewhat more risky than what a reasonable person would do.
Thus under the "conduct" but not the "mental state" version, some-
one who proceeds after deliberately considering all risks can still be
found negligent on the ground that the act was unreasonably risky
when measured against the community standard.
With both distinctions in hand, we then have three senses of
negligence: a "cause-of-action" sense, a "mental state (element)"
sense, and a "conduct (element)" sense. Holmes argued for the "con-
duct" over the "mental state" version of negligence as an element, a
position which has since generally prevailed.9 3 Though he was not
original in treating negligence as conduct, he seems to have been
the first to give a clear statement of the distinction between the two
views. He then went on to make his formulation the basis of his
primary innovation-yet another sense of negligence, an overarch-
ing principle, specific to tort law, covering both the ordinary negli-
gence cause of action and also actions basing liability on specific
conduct judged by lawmakers to be unreasonably unsafe. This for-
mulation allowed him to give a coherent account of the relation be-
tween law and fact (and so between judge and jury) in ordinary
98. FOWLERV. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCARS. GRAY, 3 THE LVi OF TORTS § 16.1
(2d ed. 1986). This standard treatise summarizes the debate over whether negligence is more
properly defined as conduct falling below a certain standard, or as an indifferent or inadvertant
state of mind. The notion of negligence as conduct promotes administrative simplicity because it
is easier to judge conduct than mental state. Moreover, it avoids leaving the cost of unreasonable
behavior on innocent victims. On the other side, the state of mind approach more closely links
legal liability with the moral culpability of the defendant. Id. In The Theory of Torts, Holmes
distinguished between "negligence latiori sensu" (in the broader sense), the conduct version, and
"negligence stricto sensu" (in the narrow sense), the state of mind version, and argued that the
former defined the breach element in the negligence action. The Theory of Torts, supra note 32,
at 334.
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negligence cases. It also supplied the basis for his claim that negli-
gence, in the sense of his Negligence Principle, covered the central
"great mass" of tort cases. 99
1. The Negligence Cause of Action
At the time Holmes wrote, the relationship between negli-
gence and torts was unclear and contested. After a long prehis-
tory,100 a "tort of negligence" had emerged from the action of tres-
pass on the case to take fairly clear shape in a few prescient judicial
decisions and bits of commentary during the 1860s. Thus the 1862
English opinion in the important Swan case stated its elements
much as we understand them today: "The action for negligence pro-
ceeds upon the idea of an obligation on the part of the defendant
towards the plaintiff to use care, and a breach of that obligation to
the plaintiffs injury."''° Of the four early treatise-writers on negli-
gence, Saunders clearly recognized a distinctive negligence action,
quoting the standard formulation-in his opening paragraph, 102 while
Shearman and Redfield, as well as Wharton, more vaguely con-
veyed awareness of the tort action in their discussions of "general
principles" of negligence.103
On the other hand, recognition of negligence as a separate
tort was by no means universal. In his monograph, Campbell did
not treat negligence as a distinct cause of action, and he explicitly
declined to locate his subject within the law of torts, reiterating
99. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
100. The earliest intimations of an "action on the case for negligence" in English law dated
back to the second half of the eighteenth century; for the history see M.J. PRICHARD, SCOTT V.
SHEPHERD (1773) AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE (1976), and David Ibbotson,
The Tort of Negligence in the Common Law in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, in
NEGLIGENCE (E.J.H. Schrage ed., 2001).
101. Swan v. N. British Australasian Co., 31 Law J., Exch. 437 (1862).
102. THOMAS WILLIAM SAUNDERS, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO NEGLIGENCE 1
(London: Butterworth's, ed., 1871) (quoting the description of the action from Swan v. North
British Austrelasian Co., 31 Law J., Exch. 437 (1862)).
103. THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE
1-14, esp. 3 (1869) ("Negligence, in respect to obligations imposed by law, is therefore called
tortious negligence."). They discuss contrbutory negligence, an aspect confined to the tort action.
Id. at 23-57. Wharton defines negligence as "such an inadvertent imperfection, by a responsible
human agent, in the discharge of a legal duty, as immediately produces, in an ordinary and
natural sequence, a damage to another." FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
NEGLIGENCE 3 (1874). We have here the elements of duty, breach, cause and injury; Wharton's
discussion indicates that he sees negligence straddling contract and tort, but also has a full dis-
cussion of contributory negligence, a doctrine specific to the tort action. Id. at 264-366.
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Austin's critique of the civilian tort-contract dichotomy.1'- As late
as the beginning of the twentieth century, Sir John Salmond was
still portraying negligence as a mental element in a number of
separate torts on his view, but not a separate tort.1 05
The ambiguous conceptual status of negligence in the
emerging law of tort was also reflected in its treatment in the two
established torts treatises. As already noted, both Hilliard and
Addison treated tort law in an unsystematic way, moving through
the recognized tort causes of action in an order revealing no clear
design. There was no chapter treating negligence as one of the rec-
ognized torts in either book. However each treatise began with a
rudimentary "general part" meant to address tort law as a whole,
and each implicitly outlined the elements of the negligence action in
this introductory part, though without any discussion of its relation
to the other torts discussed in more detail in the later chapters. 10
The first torts casebook produced at Harvard after the adop-
tion of the case method, edited by James Barr Ames in 1875, con-
tained no treatment of negligence at all, whether as a separate
cause of action or an element; instead, it was limited to a treatment
of torts involving intent or malice. Apparently this reflected the un-
finished character of the teaching materials rather than a conscious
decision to exclude negligence from the ambit of tort, but the omis-
sion of negligence from the most prestigious casebook for many
years may well have influenced the profession's sense of the rela-
tive importance of the intentional and the accidental torts. 07
104. ROBERT CAMPBELL, THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 12-13 (Stevens & Haynes ed., 1871).
Campbell made the Austinian argument that a breach of contract is as much a civil wrong-a
breach of primary duty-as are the actions conventionally recognized as delictual, and added the
point that any subcategorization of civil wrongs had to take account not only of tort and contract
but unjust enrichment-the Roman obligatio quasi ex contractu.
105. JOHN V. SAL OND, THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON ENGLISH LAW OF LIABILITY FOR
CIvIL INJUIRES § 2(3) (3d ed. 1912) M"Just as the criminal law consists of a body of rules estab-
lishing special offences, so the law of torts consists of a body of rules establishing specific inju-
ries. Neither in the one case nor in the other is there any general principle of liability."). Salmond
described negligence as a mental element, see infra note 121, but did not treat it as a distinct
tort
106. See ADDISON, supra note 7, at 15-22; HILLIARD, supra note 7, at 131-39. Addison's first
edition (1860) lacked any introductory general part on torts as a whole, or any account of the
negligence action; its nearest approximation to the latter was a chapter, supra note 7, at 237-66,
entitled "Of Trespasses and Injuries from the Negligent Use and M%anagement of Chattels, and
the Negligent Performance of Work."
107. When a second edition of the casebook was issued in 1893, it had an entire second vol-
ume devoted to negligence, the work of Jeremiah Smith, and a note by Ames indicated that the
first edition had been left incomplete. JAMES BARR AMES & JEREMIAH SMITH, 2 A SELECTION OF
CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS, at v (2d ed. 1893).
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Holmes himself apparently did not think of negligence as an
individuated tort action before the conceptual breakthrough
marked by his 1873 essay. He had occasion in one of his early arti-
cles on classification to formulate a list of recognized torts (under
the heading of "duties of all the world to all the world"), and he
came up with "assault and battery, libel, slander, false imprison-
ment, and the like, considered as causes of action civiliter." To the
same purpose, as late as 1872, he gave a similar list.108 Of course
his main objection to torts as a legal category was that it was no
more than the name of a list-an incoherent miscellany of civil
causes of action apart from contract. 10 9 But in his mind that list of
torts apparently did not include negligence.
2. The Negligence Element
The tentative treatment of the relation between tort law and
negligence by early writers on those two topics was not surprising
in light of a tradition that had mainly considered negligence not as
a distinct tort cause of action, but as an element of liability in a va-
riety of civil actions ranging across a number of fields of law. In
common-law commentary, negligence had mainly been treated un-
der the law of bailments, which was considered either a fundamen-
tal legal category in itself1 0 or a subdivision of property or contract
law."' Negligence was the fault element in the bailor's claim
against the bailee for lost or damaged property, and Lord Holt's
judgment in Coggs v. Bernard in 1703 had brought into English law
the civilian analysis of negligence into three degrees: gross, ordi-
nary, and slight. 112 The early treatises on bailments by Sir William
108. See Codes, and the Arrangement of Law, supra note 36, at 216; The Arrangement of lte
Law-Privity, supra note 46, at 305.
109. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Notice, 5 AM. L. REV. 536 (1871), reprinted in 1 WORKS,
supra note 7 at 241, 241-42 (reviewing CAMPBELL, THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (1871)).
110. Bailment was actually the subject of both the first significant English-language treatise
on any legal category, SIR WILLIAM JONES, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS (1781), and also
the first important American treatise, JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
BAILMENTS (1832). See Simpson, supra note 6, at 651-52.
111. Bailment was treated as part of the contract branch of the law of obligations in Roman
Law, ZIMMERMANN, supra note 17, at 188 (chapter on commodatum, depositum, and pignus), 204
(comparison to English law of bailment), and was still treated as basically contractual in Camp-
bell's 1871 book on the law of negligence, CAMPBELL, supra note 104, at 12. It was treated as part
of the law of property by Blackstone and Kent. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at 396, 451; KENT,
supra note 53, at 558-611.
112. Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703). The Coggs trichotomy held that the
bailee was liable only for gross negligence if the bailment was gratuitous to the bailor (looking
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Jones in England and Joseph Story in America had solidified the
tradition of considering negligence-and its three degrees-mainly
as an element in bailment actions. Thus when Holmes wanted to
insert a summary of his new negligence-centered theory of torts
into his edition of Kent's Commentaries, he had to make it a foot-
note to the Chancellor's treatment of bailments." 3 And both Camp-
bell's monograph and Wharton's treatise on negligence began with
an exposition of the three degrees of negligence from bailment law,
emphasizing the Roman-civilian roots of the doctrine.
A further traditional locus for the discussion of negligence
involved yet another area that straddled the emerging categories of
contract and tort-the responsibilities of common carriers and inn-
keepers for accidental personal injury, and for property loss or
damage."14 The largest group of suits of this kind were against
common carriers, who were also bailees of shipped goods. As com-
mon carriage came to be a routine commercial service, the most
contested issue with respect to these liabilities was whether they
could be disclaimed by notice or agreement-a decision that we as-
sociate with the question whether the liability rule should be classi-
fied under contract or tort.15
Even the writers who recognized negligence as a separate
tort action had to spend most of their time discussing it as an issue
of bailment and carrier law. Shearman and Redfield wrote that if
they treated negligence only as a tort this would leave the profes-
sion "without any information upon several important branches,"
after a friend's pet), liable for even the slightest negligence if gratuitous to the bailee (loaning a
car to a friend), and liable for ordinary negligence where the bailment was for mutual benefit (a
car rental).
113. KENT, supra note 53, at 561 n.1.
114. See POLLOCK, supra note 29, at 339-40. Innkeepers and common carriers were required
by law to serve all reasonable comers, refusal to serve was a tort (the origin of our law of anti-
discrimination in public accommodations), and by extension injury to a customer in the course of
the required service was also a tort.
115. See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 205-07
(1977); see also Kaczorowski, supra note 69, at 138-44 (describing nineteenth century trend to-
ward making the strict liability disclaimable, once it was recognized that it was a form of com-
pulsory insurance that commercial shippers should be free to decline). For us the main conse-
quence of placing liabilities arising out of consensual relations in tort or contract involve dis-
claimability; thus the decisive shift of strict product liability from contract to tort came with
decisions to the effect that disclaimers of liability for product defects would not generally be
upheld where they involved threats to safety. This could occur in cases that were formally based
on warranty (hence arguably contractual), see e.g., Henningsen v. Bloonifield Motors, 161 A.2d 69
(N.J. 1960), or in cases that explicitly based the liability on a new form of strict liability in tort,
see e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
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and they went on to discuss bailment and carrier cases at length. 116
Wharton devoted a whole section of his treatise to cases in which
the duty of due care arose out of contract, thus allowing the plain-
tiff to elect between suing for negligence in contract or tort.11 7 And
in the bulk of his book, after his clear statement of the elements of
negligence as a tort action, Saunders also mainly discussed case
law in the debatable middle ground. 118
In short, negligence in 1870 was just emerging as a tort
cause of action, and otherwise was a concept only loosely linked to
the nascent law of torts. It was much more commonly considered an
element or issue in bodies of law like bailment and common carrier
liability; these in turn were understood either as freestanding legal
categories, or as overlapping the line between contract and tort.
3. Mental Element or Conduct
The further question then arose whether negligence, re-
garded as an element, was to be understood as a mental state-cul-
pable carelessness--or simply as conduct that departed from the
standard of the reasonable man. Holmes' first scholarly engagement
with negligence involved this question. He first endorsed the con-
cept as sufficiently "philosophical" to be a proper topic for scholarly
study in one 1871 book review, 119 but changed his mind later that
year when reviewing Campbell's Law of Negligence forced him to
focus on the Austinian analysis of negligence as a careless or inad-
vertent state of mind. 120 The mental-state view articulated by
116. SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 103, at iv. The authors went on to make clear their
allegiance to the tort-contract dichotomy, and to show their understanding of its civilian roots,
when they wrote that "treatises expository of the common law... arranged in strict logical or-
der" would have to await the coming of "some new Pothier" who would "do for America and Eng-
land what the first Pothier did for France." Id. at iv-v.
117. WHARTON, supra note 103, at 393-654.
118. SAUNDERS, supra note 102, at 15-61 (evidence of negligence), 155-224 (negligence of at-
torneys, bailees, common carriers, innkeepers, physicians-the "non-stranger" situations of tort-
contract ambiguity that provided most of the negligence cases)
119. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Notice, 5 AM. L. REV. 343 (1871) (reviewing SHEARMAN &
REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 1870)).
120. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Notice, 5 AM. L. REV. 536 (1871) (reviewing ROBERT
CAMPBELL, THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (1871)); see also THE COMMON LAW, supra note 78, at 86
n.48, where Holmes again cited Campbell "for Austin's point of view." In his detailed treatment
of culpable mental states, Austin followed Bentham in distinguishing among "negligence," which
in his terminology applied only to omissions, "heedlessness" or culpable inadvertance to risk, and
"rashness," or culpable failure to give adequate consideration of a risk actually noted, the latter
two of which applied to acts. See Analysis of Pervading Notions, supra note 49, at 425-34; Jer-
emy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, reprinted in 1 THE
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Campbell was widely held among nineteenth century commenta-
tors, 121 and Holmes apparently accepted it without question on this
first encounter.
Holmes' point was that if negligence was a mental state to be
alleged and proved as a fact to a jury, it could only serve as an ele-
ment of liability in an incoherent collection of civil cases. In other
cases involving similar issues, legislation or common law doctrine
premised liability on proof of specific conduct, without any refer-
ence to state of mind. Negligence understood as a factual mental
state would thus not be a promising concept around which tort law,
or any distinctive portion of it, could usefully be organized.12-'
Holmes' rejection of negligence as a fruitful concept for legal analy-
sis thus fit well with his view, expressed later the same year, that
tort was not a proper substantive legal category.
An alternative to the view of negligence as a mental fact,
though, was available in standard definitions given by common law
judges. These treated negligence simply as conduct falling below
the standard set by the reasonable man, without any reference to
an inadvertent state of mind. Thus, as Baron Alderson defined it in
the Blyth case in 1856: "Negligence is the omission to do something
that a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which or-
dinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or some-
thing which a prudent and reasonable man would not do."12 If neg-
ligence was whatever the reasonable man would not do, it was ir-
relevant how carefully and thoroughly the party charged with neg-
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 43-44. Later writers did not generally follow
these elaborate distinctions, but treated acts and omissions, both advertent and inadvertent,
under the single concept of negligence.
121. Thus Shearman and Redfield defined negligence as "carelessness ... want of care, cau-
tion, attention, diligence, or discretion, in one having no positive intention to injure the person
complaining thereof." SHEARIAN & REDFIELD, supra note 103, at 1-2. Wharton followed Austin
in carefully analyzing negligence and intent as qualitatively distinct and mutually exclusive
states of mind, to be inferred as a matter of fact from the evidence in each case. WHARTON, supra
note 103, at 11-17. The "state of mind" approach by no means passed away with the nineteenth
century; it was still stated to be the law in Salmond's influential English treatise.
Negligence and wrongful intent are the two alternative forms of mens rea, one
of the other of which is commonly required by law as a condition of liability.
Each consists in a certain mental attitude of the defendant toward the conse-
quences of his act... He is guilty of negligence ... when he ... is ... indiffer-
ent or careless whether they happen or not ....
SALMOND, supra note 105, at § 5(1).
122. And quite consistently, Salmond, a leading proponent of the "state of mind" conception,
denied that tort law as a whole had any defining structure. See supra note 105.
123. Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks, 11 Ex. 781, 784 (1856).
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ligence had contemplated the risks. 124 Specific authority to this ef-
fect was the 1837 English case of Vaughan v. Menlove, upholding
the denial of an instruction that a defendant could not be found
negligent if he had "acted bona fide to the best of his judgment."
That the defendant had done his best did not mean that he had
acted as a reasonably prudent man. 125
B. Holmes'Innovations
1. The Centrality of Negligence
Holmes made no reference to the "reasonable man" test as
suggesting an alternative conduct-based conception of negligence in
his 1871 review of Campbell's book. He was surely aware of the ob-
jective element in the standard negligence charge, but perhaps in-
terpreted it as Tindal, C.J., had presented it in Vaughan, as an ad
hoc practical concession to the difficulty of taking individual peculi-
arities into account in proving the actual mental state of the defen-
dant. 126 As such, it was fully reconcilable in principle with the
Austinian analysis, and this is how most of the early judges and
commentators who dealt with negligence as a legal concept seem to
have understood it.
But Holmes apparently continued to wrestle with the intui-
tion that negligence was a promising concept around which to or-
ganize tort law, and at some point he broke through to the
reformulation that he set out in "The Theory of Torts." Negligence
was not, as ordinary usage suggested and as jurisprudential tradi-
tion maintained, a state of mind, and so a matter of fact, to be de-
termined by the jury as present or not on the evidence in each case.
Rather it was a complex legal conclusion, a determination that a
public standard of conduct existed, that it applied to a party's con-
duct, and that the conduct fell below the standard. The "reasonable
man" test was not a concession to the difficulties of proving individ-
124. Hover v. Barkoof, 44 N.Y. 113, 117 (1871) (testimony of defendant engineer that he be.
lieved all necessary steps for safety of bridge had been taken was properly excluded as irrelevant
and potentially prejudicial).
125. Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N. C. 468, 471, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
126. See id. at 475.
Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence should be co-
extensive with the judgment of each individual, which would be as variable as
the foot of each individual, we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires
in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would ob-
serve.
Id.
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ual capacities and states of mind, but rather a substantively dis-
tinct theory of liability.
Though Holmes was the first to formulate the point clearly,
this much could have been pieced together from existing doctrine,
taking account of the established elements of duty (due care as the
standard of conduct) and breach (violation of that standard) in the
usual formulation of the negligence cause of action. All that was
needed was to join these to the objective ("reasonable man") aspect
of the concept of negligence, which had been stated in Vaughan and
Blyth.
Holmes' next step, though, was more inventive. He postu-
lated an overarching principle of objective negligence, based on the
general idea of a public standard of reasonable behavior, applicable
to all conduct creating risks to others. He then argued that this
principle was sometimes applied as an operative standard to the
facts, as in a normal negligence case, but other times it was speci-
fied, legislatively or judicially, into more particular rules defining
what would be considered reasonable or unreasonable in recurring
situations. This expansion of the concept of negligence brought
within its ambit a wide array of legislated and judge-made tort
rules that did not in so many words require "due care" or make li-
ability turn on "negligence." These rules could nonetheless be inter-
preted as defining what counted as reasonable conduct for the
situations they covered. This was the innovation that allowed
Holmes to say that negligence (thus expansively reconceived) cov-
ered "the great mass of [tort] cases."127
Holmes' formulation did more than widen the scope of negli-
gence; it also supplied the first clear rationale for the respective
roles of judge and jury in deciding the breach issue in ordinary
negligence cases. When jurors decided whether someone had acted
with due care, on Holmes' theory they were not simply finding facts,
at least not adjudicative facts about an individual litigant's state of
mind.128 Rather, they were endeavoring to "suggest a rule of law to
127. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
128. This was the orthodox view, stated in an unsigned book review that, on the basis of its
style and content, appears to have been written by Nicholas St. John Green. See Green, Booh
Notice, supra note 14, at 351.
As we understand the question it is as follows: 1) Does the law impose a duty or
obligation? 2) What is that duty or obligation? These are questions of law. 3)
Was the conduct under investigation a violation of that duty? . . . The legal
duty which is generally imposed, is to take that forethought for the rights of
others which under the particular circumstances of the case might be expected
from a person of mature age who is not deficient in prudence. Whether that
forethought has been exercised is a question of fact. Negligence is conduct
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the court" by using their knowledge of a social fact: the existence of
a social norm of conduct, "the practice of the average member of the
community-what a prudent man would do under the circum-
stances." This practice or customary conduct then served as the
standard in those cases where neither legislature nor court had fur-
ther specified the elements of reasonable care. 129
Holmes thus brought to the center of tort law negligence re-
conceived in terms of conduct, which he here called "negligence la-
tiori sensu" ("in the looser sense"). 130 This focusing of tort law upon
objective negligence was his most important innovation. He would
again emphasize the centrality of negligence to torts in The Com-
mon Law by beginning his treatment of the subject with his Chap-
ter 3, "Trespass and Negligence," which dealt with the choice of
negligence over strict liability as the default principle for handling
accidents. This left the intentional torts for subordinate treatment
in Chapter 4, where Holmes applied the analysis in terms of con-
duct creating risk that he had already established in his discussion
of negligence; intentional wrongdoing was causing harm by conduct
more risky as a matter of degree mere negligence. None of the other
torts commentators or treatise writers of the nineteenth century
followed Holmes in either this order of exposition or this conceptual
priority.
arising from want of forethought which violates a legal duty. In our opinion
negligence is a question of fact.
Id. at 351. Green's analysis is based on the Austinian theory, so Holmes seems not to have do.
rived his importantly novel reconception of negligence from Green. The "mental fact" view of
negligence was maintained in the face of Holmes' arguments by a great contemporary and some-
time collaborator of his in James Bradley Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Coln-
mon Law, 226-29, 249-53 (1898) (negligence is a pure question of fact, but one on which, for rea-
sons of policy, courts review the judgment of the jury more aggressively than usual).
129. The Theory of Torts, supra note 32, at 330. Holmes' account of the jury role in negligence
determinations led him to propose his idea that judges would tend to reduce the standard of care
to rule-like formulations in recurring situations, thereby cutting back the law-making role of the
jury. His own judicial efforts in this direction were not successful in the United States. See
Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934). Some now regret this, see Kenneth Abraham, The
Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1187 (2001), but Holmes' project was carried out to an
extreme in England, where judicial formulations of separate type-situational standards of care
proliferated to the point where more than 1000 pages of Beven's work on negligence were re-
quired to record them by 1928. THOMAS BEVEN, NEGLIGENCE IN LAW (4th ed. 1928). Shortly
thereafter, jury trial in negligence cases was discontinued by statute. See IBBETSON, supra note
21, at 188-91. Holmes himself would not have wanted to go that far; he "believe[d] in our practice
of leaving questions of negligence to" the jury, which helped to keep "the administration of the
law in accord with the wishes and feelings of the community." Law in Science, supra note 7, at
418.
130. The Theory of Torts, supra note 32, at 334.
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2. The Tripartite Classification of Torts
Having placed objective negligence at the center of the spec-
trum of tort liability standards, Holmes portrayed it in "The Theory
of Torts" as bracketed by "two extremes." At one end were rules of
true strict liability, both ancient and modern; at the other were
rules requiring true moral culpability-intent to harm, or malice, or
"cnegligence stricto sensu," meaning Austinian negligence, a culpa-
bly careless "actual condition of the defendant's consciousness." 131
Here we find the familiar tripartite arrangement of torts into those
involving serious fault, those involving only negligence, and those
requiring no fault at all. This structure would be adopted by Mel-
ville Bigelow in his Elements of Torts in 1878, and by Sir Frederick
Pollock in his treatise in 1887-the first modern treatise on tort
law-from whence it went on to become the standard organizing
scheme for the subject to this day.132 Bigelow explicitly and Pollock
more vaguely gave due credit to Holmes as the primary innova-
tor. 133
In The Common Law, Holmes would retain the basic idea of
a tripartite structure dominated by objective negligence in the cen-
ter, with strict liability at one end. At the other end, however, he
placed, not torts involving malice or intent, but rather doctrines of
privilege that protected conduct from liability, sometimes even con-
duct willfully or maliciously doing harm, on the basis of a judgment
that the conduct in question required extra breathing room from
the law. 134
131. Id. at 327.
132. POLLOCK, supra note 29, at 12-14. Pollock took the additional step of comparing the tri-
partite organization with the Roman law concepts of dolus, culpa, and obligatio quasi ex delicto
respectively, and hence linking the common law scheme to civilian categories. In Roman Law,
dolus meant "fraud," but could be expanded to encompass intentional wrongdoing more gener-
ally; culpa could mean fault generally, or the lesser variety of fault corresponding to negligence.
Pollock's equation of the Roman liability quasi ex delicto with strict liability has not been uni-
formly followed; Austin thought the Roman category incoherent, and Pothier equated it with
negligence, while treating the Roman culpa as intentional or malicious wrongdoing. See Analysis
of Pervading Notions, supra note 49, at 343, 497-98; POTHIER, supra note 52, at 73 (noting tort is
an act causing damage through "fraud or malice," quasi-tort act causing damage "without malice,
but through inexcusable imprudence"). A valuable analysis of Roman law influences on the
nineteenth-century development of negligence doctrine is David Ibbetson, supra note 18.
133. POLLOCK, supra note 29, at vi; MELVILLE BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF TORTS at
v (1878). Eventually the tripartite scheme would become standard in the organization of Ameri-
can tort casebooks, at least with JAMES BARR AMES & JEREMIAH SMITH, A SELECTION OF CASES
ON THE LAW OF TORTS (Roscoe Pound ed., 1916).
134. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 78, at 128.
The theory of torts may be summed up very simply. At the two extremes of the
law are rules determined by policy without reference of any kind to morality.
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The categories of intentional (or malicious) torts on the one
hand and privileged activity on the other are closely connected un-
der Holmes' theory of torts. If, as Holmes argued, liability for negli-
gence is the default rule in tort law, to require intent or malice for
liability is to protect that class of risky conduct by a qualified
privilege to inflict harm negligently. Holmes finally got his views
clear on the relation between privilege and serious wrongdoing in
"Privilege, Malice, and Intent" in 1894,135 arguing that the law
grants privileges protecting socially valued conduct like the owner's
free use of land, or the entrepreneur's freedom to start a business,
but normally withdraws those privileges in cases of injury inflicted
out of pure malice. In the 1894 essay, Holmes also returned to the
tripartite structure as he had formulated it originally in 1873, and
as we generally understand it today, dividing torts into those in-
volving malice or intent, negligence (the general rule), and strict
liability for mere "mischance." 13 6
3. Objective Negligence as Compromise
Partaking of both moral fault and no-fault, objective negli-
gence mediated between the two poles of the tort spectrum. "Actual
fault" or blameworthiness was an important influence, invoking as
it did socially defined standards of prudent conduct. But the objec-
tive element could also be seen as itself a kind of strict liability, mo-
tivated by each person's right to expect normal conduct of (even ab-
normal) others, and by a policy of putting deterrent pressure for
Certain harms a man may inflict even wickedly; for certain others he must an.
swer, although his conduct has been prudent and beneficial to the community.
But in the main the law ...adopted the vocabulary, and in some degree the
tests, of morals.
Id.
135. Privilege, Malice, and Intent, supra note 93.
136. Id. at 371-72 CIf the manifest probability of harm is very great, and the harm follows,
we say that it is done maliciously or intentionally; if not so great, but still considerable, we say
that the harm is done negligently; if there is no apparent danger, we call it mischance."). Privi-
lege, Malice, and Intent, id. at 372-77, also provided the structure of another of Holmes' innova-
tions in tort theory, what became known as the doctrine of prima facie intentional tort. See
Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904) (Holmes, J.); Kenneth Vandevelde, A History of
Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a General Theory of Intentional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447
(1990). This doctrine provided the conceptual underpinnings for Holmes' celebrated dissents in
labor injunction cases in the late 1890s, the opinions that probably convinced Theodore Roosevelt
to appoint him to the United States Supreme Court. See Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015
(Mass. 1900) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (Mass. 1896)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); see also WHITE supra note 78, at 300 (identifying labor dissents as
"strong point in Holmes' favor" for Roosevelt).
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safety on socially useful but more than usually risky activities.
Thus the legal attribution of negligence was not ultimately con-
strained by moral (which in Holmes' usage meant purely internal)
conceptions of personal virtue or wickedness.137
In Chapter 3 of The Common Law, Holmes took care to em-
phasize that the principle of objectivity was not simply based on the
evidentiary difficulties involved in taking account of "minute differ-
ences of character," the ground that had been given for the objective
test in Vaughn v. Menlove.138 A "more satisfactory" reason for the
objective standard was substantive. A naturally hasty or awkvard
person's slips, he said, were "no less troublesome to his neighbors
than if they sprang from guilty neglect." Tort liability in such cases,
though not based on actual moral fault, was "necessary to the gen-
eral welfare."
Holmes' point in this passage was that the victim's expecta-
tion of normal behavior from others in risky interactions deserves
the law's protection as much as does the injurer's expectation that
he will not be penalized if he does the best he can. Both expecta-
tions cannot be entirely fulfilled, and the law treats both equally
when it strikes the compromise embodied in the objective standard.
Moreover, Holmes made it explicit that the objective standard of
negligence was a compromise between true fault and strict liabil-
ity-a "middle point between the horns of this dilemma." 139 This
middle way could be seen in two aspects: either as striking the eq-
uitable balance required by corrective justice,1 40 or (more function-
137. See 2 HOWE, supra note 12, at 169-70, 176-78 (citing standard nineteenth century
criminal law treatises for the individual moral approach to fault). Howe describes this approach
as Kantian, referring to Kant's theory of personal ethics, which locates all virtue in the good will.
This is a common misattribution. Kant, who insisted on a sharp separation of public justice from
the ethics of private virtue, himself held an external theory of legal liability very much like
Holmes' (as Holmes was quite aware-he had noted it in the French translation of the Rcchitsle-
hre that he read, id. at 178 n.48). When Holmes speaks against confusing "morality" with law, it
is almost always traditional Christian morality that he has in mind-the morality that "see[s]
men as God sees them," THE COAMMON LAW, supra note 78, at 86, and hence considers a sin in the
heart to be of the same order as a sin in deed. Holmes' understanding of the Kantian distinction
between external legal justice, and subjective and inner ethical virtue, is suggested by the con-
clusion of Chapter 1 of The Coninwn Law, where he insists that on the one hand "the terminol-
ogy of morals is still retained, and.., the law does still and always, in a certain sense, measure
legal liability by moral standards," while on the other hand "by the very necessity of its nature,
[it] is continually transmuting those moral standards into external or objective ones, from which
the actual guilt of the party concerned is wholly eliminated." THE COmiON LAW, supra note 78,
at 33. Holmes' equivocation with the word "moral" here is consistent with a Kantian division of
the realm of morality between a sphere of objective justice, and one of inner ethical virtue.
138. See supra note 126.
139. THE COmmON LAW, supra note 78, at 86.
140. As argued by WVEINRIB, supra note 4, at 177-83.
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ally) as a compromise between the two lines of deterrence-based
argument favoring negligence and strict liability respectively. 4,
4. Harm, and the Domain of Torts
In The Common Law, Holmes would explicitly formulate the
evil against which tort law was directed as the doing of harm,
rather than the infringement of rights or the violation of duties.
The general question for the law to answer was when "a man is li-
able for harm which he has done."'42 The purpose of torts was "to
secure a man against certain forms of harm," and to sanction the
acts causing them "not because they are wrong, but because they
are harms."'143 The general principle was that "[m]ost liabilities in
tort ... are founded on the infliction of harm which the defendant
had a reasonable opportunity to avoid."144
Not every interest whose infringement counted as harm es-
tablished a right; not every doing of harm violated a duty. The con-
crete rights and duties of the law had to be spelled out by striking a
balance between the social interests in preventing the doing of
harm on the one side, and protecting freedom of action on the other.
To make every harm to an individual's interests a wrong "would
interfere with other equally important enjoyments on the part of
his neighbors." Hence the law privileged certain acts against liabil-
ity even though the actor foresaw "that harm to another will follow
from them."'145 Holmes' point in using this terminology was to em-
141. For the deterrent case supporting strict liability, see Arizona Employers' Liability Cases,
250 U.S. 400, 431 (1919) (Holmes, J., concurring); negligence liability serves to deter unsafe
conduct by designating individual unreasonably unsafe acts, rather than identifying risky activi.
ties that are the cheapest cost-avoider of injuries jointly caused by their interaction with other
activities. Holmes was generally careful to preserve the neutrality of his account of tort law
between a forward-looking account emphasizing deterrence, and a retrospective one based on
corrective justice. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 78, at 115 (aim of tort law to "prevent or
indemnify from harm"); id. at 116 (purpose of tort law "to prevent or secure indemnity from harm
at the hands of his neighbors"); Privilege, Malice, and Intent, supra note 93, at 371 (Tort law
"recognizes temporal damage as an evil which its object is to prevent or to redress ... .") (empha-
sis added). In this he followed Austin, who distinguished civil relief from criminal punishment
on the ground that whereas the latter was justified solely by its deterrent effect, the former
served the dual purpose of prevention and redress. See Analysis of Pervading Notions, supra note
49, at 503-04; see also supra note 51.
142. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 78, at 64.
143. Id. at 115.
144. Id. at 116.
145. Id. at 115. In Privilege, Malice, and Intent, supra note 93, at 371-72, Holmes further re-
fined his account: tort liability was triggered by "temporal damage" to plaintiff, by an act of the
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phasize that the rights and duties established in tort decisions were
not premises taken from pre-existing law, but conclusions shaped
by the judges' traditional common law power to strike the commu-
nity's balance between freedom and security. Torts was thus an
autonomous body of substantive law.
Holmes did not yet explicitly formulate the idea of harm as
the trigger in "The Theory of Torts." But he avoided the conven-
tional formulation of negligence as breach of a duty of care, which
implied a standard of conduct based on pre-existing rights and du-
ties found elsewhere in the law. Property law spelled out such a
body of independent rights, but there was no independent "law of
bodily security" parallel to property law, and Holmes' innovations
shifted emphasis toward the personal injury case. Instead of duty
and breach, Holmes simply spoke of the "standard of conduct," and
went on to offer his analysis of the respective roles of judge and jury
in formulating that standard.146
Under the more familiar formulation in terms of duties (with
their correlative rights), tort was essentially remedial, providing
civil damage awards for violations of primary norms established in
other departments of law. Thomas Cooley implied as much in his
influential torts treatise of 1879, which thus failed to designate any
distinctive primary conduct for tort law to govern.147 By contrast,
Holmes made torts a system of positive claims and liabilities aimed
at preventing or redressing secular harms, thus rescuing the sub-
ject from his own Austinian critique of it as merely a remedial cate-
gory.148
defendant whose "manifest tendency" was to inflict such damage, subject to privileges that ex-
empted defendant from liability if his act was done with "just cause.*
146. The Theory of Torts, supra note 32, at 327-31.
147. After a sophisticated discussion of the power of "judicial legislation possessed by com-
mon law judges, THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH
ARE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 11-19 (1879), Cooley laid the basis for his presentation of tort
doctrine with a chapter entitled "General Classification of Legal Rights." id. at 23, which dealt
with "security in person," "security in the acquisition and enjoyment of property," and "security
in the family relationsL]" id. at 29. The latter two classes of rights were defined elsewhere in the
law, of course, and "personal rights" were defined by the protections offered them by criminal as
well as tort law. The connections of tort law to other aspects of the law are emphasized by such
an arrangement; but its unity and its coherence as a subject in its own right are not as clear. We
still speak of many tort causes of action mainly in terms of the rights they protected-thus "the
right of privacy," and the tort remedies for violations of constitutional rights by government
officials. See David Leebron, The Right to Priracy's Place in the Intellectual History of Tort Law,
41 CASE XV. RES. L REV. 769, 769-92 (1990), for a good discussion of the distinction between
right-based and harm-based accounts of tort law, using Cooley and Holmes as representatives of
the two tendencies.
148. Holmes did not make a dogma out the formulation in terms of harm, but sometimes
himself stated tort doctrines in terms of rights and duties, as with his justification of the last
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The connotations of the formulation in terms of harm gave
torts a grander part indeed. A modern government's main job,
specified by nineteenth century liberal theory as formulated by
John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, was to deal with conduct doing
"harm to others."149 When contractual liability was treated in tradi-
tional liberal fashion as non-coercive because based on consent, the
rules of tort liability could be seen as Holmes described them in The
Common Law, as the law's authoritative baseline of "the conduct
which every one may fairly expect and demand from every other,
whether that other has agreed to it or not."150
Though in the 1873 article Holmes had yet to formulate tort
law in terms of harm as such, he did anticipate the later move in
his answer to his own earlier objection that torts had no proper
substantive domain. He boldly affirmed that torts was indeed a
proper subject because "an enumeration of the [tort] actions which
have been successful, and of those which have failed, defines the
extent of the primary duties imposed by the law."'51 Holmes' point
was that it is mainly through tort law, its mildest vehicle of coer-
cion, that the state draws the line between the acts it will regulate
and those it will leave alone. 152 Tort thus deals with the space be-
tween contract and crime-imposing liabilities based on wrong
rather than consent, but wrong that is not serious enough to merit
punishment. 153 It is a space dominated by accidental injuries negli-
gently caused. These wrongs constitute the special domain of torts,
the subject-matter that makes it an important branch of the sub-
stantive law. The "law of bodily security" and its correlative "law of
personal liberty" is made up of the rules of tort and criminal law,
and because tort is the less drastic mode of the two modes of coer-
wrongdoer rule in Privilege, Malice, and Intent, supra note 93, at 377-79, and his denial of tort
recovery for foreseeable pecuniary loss from a negligent breach of contract to someone who was
neither a party to the contract nor an intended beneficiary. See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v.
Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1927).
149. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 1-2 (1859). Mill's formulation in terms of harm marks
the modern shift of liberal theory away from the earlier Lockeian formulation in terms of natural
rights.
150. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 78, at 63.
151. The Theory of Torts, supra note 32, at 331 (emphasis added).
152. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (treating a tort rule granting
damages for defamation as a law abridging the freedom of the press).
153. And, we might add, wrongdoing that is not serious enough to justify either granting pu-
nitive damages to those injured by it, or prohibiting liability insurance as contrary to public
policy.
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cion, it draws the law's most basic line between freedom and protec-
tion.154
5. Strict liability and Extrahazardous Activities
Holmes' centering of torts around its lowest cognizable level
of wrongdoing, ordinary negligence, naturally raised the question
whether his theory required that conduct must be wrongful
(blameworthy) at all in order to be tortious. His answer was clear;
both in "The Theory of Torts" and in The Common Law he accepted
liability without fault as a legitimate if relatively peripheral part of
tort law. Later he would come to recognize that the idea of enter-
prise liability might even make strict liability central, though he
never actually endorsed recasting tort theory along those lines. 155
But from the first, Holmes recognized the English courts' modern
recognition of strict liability in Rylands v. Fletcher as good law, and
he never joined forces with the many prestigious judges and com-
mentators of his period who believed that the conceptual purity of
tort law, or liberal principles of formal equality and economic free-
dom, or a devotion to economic development required rejection of
tort liability without fault.'56
154. Tort law of course overlaps with criminal law in the area of serious wrongdoing, where
it provides redress for harms resulting from crimes. But its distinctive subject matter is the
wrongs not serious enough to be made crimes.
155.
Our law of torts comes from the old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs...
But the torts with which our courts are kept busy today are mainly the inci-
dents of certain well known businesses. They are injuries to person or property
by railroads, factories, and the like. The liability for them is estimated, and
sooner or later goes into the price paid by the public. The public really pays the
damages, and the question of liability, if pressed far enough, is really the ques-
tion how far it is desirable that the public should insure the safety of those
whose work it uses.
The Path of the Law, supra note 46, at 397. Jury behavior in workplace injury cases shows that
"the inclination of a very large part of the community is to make certain classes of persons insure
the safety of those with whom they deaL" Id.; see also Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250
U.S. 400, 432 (1919) (Holmes, J., concurring) (giving insurance rationale to justify constitution-
ality of statute imposing employer strict liability for workplace injuries). For my doubts that
Holmes ever actually accepted enterprise liability, see infra note 170.
156. Most notable to this effect was Brown v. Collins, in which Judge Doe quoted Holmes'
passage from The Theory of Torts interpreting Rylands as imposing liability for "extra-hazardous
activities," and expressly repudiated it as carrying liability too far. Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H.
442, 445-46 (1873); see also Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271 (1911) (striking down New York
statute that held employers strictly liable for employee injuries on grounds that constitution
prohibits liability without fault); Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873) (refusing to impose strict
liability for exploding steam boiler, rejecting Rylands); COOLEY, supra note 147, at 81 (That
which is right and lawful for one man to do cannot furnish the foundation for an action in favor
of another."); Smith, supra note 30 (proposing exclusion of strict civil liability from field of tort on
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Nor did Holmes regard existing strict liability rules merely
as survivals from a more primitive era. 157 In "The Theory of Torts,"
he explicitly distinguished between "ancient examples ... traceable
to conceptions of a much ruder sort," and modern rules based on
"more or less definitely thought out views of public policy." He put
the Rylands doctrine in the latter category, justified by "the princi-
ple that it is politic to make those who go into extra-hazardous em-
ployments take the risk on their own shoulders."'158 This is, so far as
I know, the first use of the "extrahazardous" concept, though com-
mon-law courts had often justified pockets of strict liability by ar-
guments of policy. 159
Holmes supported strict liability for extrahazardous activi-
ties with an insight he had developed in the jurisprudence course
he taught at Harvard in 1872.160 He argued that civil liability did
not always imply a legal duty, an "absolute wish" on the part of the
sovereign to prohibit the conduct in question. Compensatory dam-
ages were sometimes imposed on permitted conduct to make the
actor pay the price, as in the case of private eminent domain; and in
other cases damages could be imposed to discourage an activity
ground that fault should be essential to tort liability); Ezra Thayer, Liability Without Fault, 29
HARV. L. REV. 801, 814-15 (1916) (stating that fundamental principle of the common law is that
liability is linked to fault). For Pollock's more nuanced opposition to Rylands, see Frederick
Pollock, Duties of Insuring Safety: The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 2 L.Q. REV. 52 (1886), and
POLLOCK, supra note 29, at 393 (explaining that "the ground on which a rule of strict obligation
has been maintained and consolidated by modern authorities is the magnitude of the danger,
coupled with the difficulty of proving negligence as the specific cause, in the particular event of
the danger having ripened into actual harm"). See also DAVID ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN HOLMES
147-59 (1995) (showing that Holmes was not interpreted as a critic of Rylands in his own time).
157. Cf. James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 97-99 (1908). Holmes did
believe that the generalized strict liability of employers for the torts of their employees, and of
common carriers for goods, were survivals, and could not be justified at their full scope by the
policies that were cited in their behalf. But he thought in both cases that enterprise liability
might justify the liability of corporate or other business defendants under these doctrines. See
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Agency 1, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345, 353-63 (1891), reprinted in 3 WORKS,
supra note 7, at 347-54; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Agency II, 5 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14-23 (1891),
reprinted in 3 WORKS, supra note 7, at 364-71; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Common Carriers and the
Common Law, 13 AM. L. REV. 609 (1879) [hereinafter Common Carriers], reprinted in 3 WORKS,
supra note 7, at 60, 61, 74-75.
158. The Theory of Torts, supra note 32, at 326.
159. For example the strict liability of carriers for loss of goods was justified on the twin pol-
icy grounds of the shipper's lack of access to proof of a carrier's fault, and the need to deter carri-
ers from colluding with robbers. See Kaczorowski, supra note 69, at 1135-37. Holmes thought
these policy arguments were largely bogus rationalizations of a "survival" that derived from the
ancient strict liability of all bailees, established at a time when the owner had no remedy over
against a thief who stole from the bailee. Common Carriers, supra note 157, at 61.
160. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law Magazine & Review, 6 AM. L. REV. 723 (1872) [herein-
after Law Magazine & Review], reprinted in 1 WORKS, supra note 7, at 294, in which Holmes
used the excuse of a book review to summarize what he had taught in the course.
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without prohibiting it, a kind of private analog to an excise tax on
liquor or a protective tariff.16' Where the sovereign had a genuinely
mandatory intent, plenty of serious legal remedies were available-
for example, criminal punishment, injunctions, and punitive dam-
ages. So the choice to impose compensatory damages as the sole
remedial consequence of conduct left open the possibility that the
lawmaker did not intend a prohibition. 162
Austin had treated civil liability as equivalent to punish-
ment, and so invariably expressing the sovereign's prohibition of
the conduct in question. Holmes' point was that the relatively weak
remedy of compensatory damages could be made available for harm
caused by conduct that was thought justified as long as the price
was paid. A primary example he had used in his jurisprudence
course was the strict liability imposed for "injuries from extra-
hazardous sources." And to illustrate that the decision whether or
not to impose tort liability could turn on policy considerations inde-
pendent of the defendant's wrongdoing, he noted that the usual
strict responsibility for straying animals was relaxed in some west-
ern states, where the impracticability of fencing made it too much
of a burden on essential economic activity.163
161. This insight, one of Holmes' most original, underlies much current literature-including
the idea that civil liability characteristically charges a price, while criminal penalties inflict
punishment, see Coffee, supra note 51; the distinction between property rules and liability rules,
see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One Iew of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); the theory of efficient breach in con-
tract, see RIcHARD A- POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 107 (3d ed. 1986); and the idea that
strict liability in tort might be used to encourage efficient activity levels for lawful forms of con-
duct, see S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5-46 (1987).
162. It is useful to keep Holmes' limited point about the compensatory damage remedy dis-
tinct from the more general skepticism he sometimes expressed about the grounding of law in a
deontological morality of rights and duties. The two are often conflated (as they sometimes were
by Holmes himself). See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of Mac-
Pherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 173743 (1998). As the discussion in the text shows, the nar-
rower doctrine depends on the existence of genuinely peremptory legal duties and rights, evi-
denced by remedies more stringent than compensatory damages. Under this analysis private
law, where compensatory payment is the standard remedy, is then seen as an arena for the
"ivil" (in all senses) adjustment of human friction, and not involving rights that are to be "taken
seriously" in the sense that they are meant to trump policy judgments.
Corrective-justice views of tort law are entirely consistent with this view, i& like Ernest
Weinrib's version, they give no trumping effect to the rights they recognize, and so place no ob-
stacle in the way of legislative decisions to limit or even abolish tort law public policy grounds.
See WEINRIB, supra note 4, at 210-12. Taking private law as a domain of serious (trumping)
rights comes most naturally to libertarians; it condemns workers' compensation as unjust, as in
Ives v. South Buffalo Railway, 201 N.Y. 271 (1911), and carried out consistently would treat New
Zealand as a human rights violator for its abolition of tort claims for negligent injury.
163. Law Magazine & Review, supra note 160, at 297.
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Holmes reiterated his support for the legitimacy of strict li-
ability in his more complete treatment of torts in The Common
Law. Again arraying tort rules along a spectrum, with objective
negligence covering the great middle area, Holmes added for the
first time a discussion of the imposition of strict liability on grounds
of corrective justice as well as instrumental policy. 16 4 He also em-
phasized and amplified a point he had made in "The Theory of
Torts"-that the rules resulting from specification of the negligence
principle were often difficult to distinguish from strict liability
rules laid down for reasons of public policy. Not only was strict li-
ability legitimate in itself, but it also faded off by indistinct degrees
into the category of rules specifying what should count as due care
in recurring situations. 16 5
On the basis of Chapter 3 of The Common Law, Holmes has
often been misread as a champion of the principle of no liability
without fault. His best-known torts passage is the one in which he
argued that losses should presumptively lie where they fall, and
that fault alone justifies shifting them. He counseled that if society
wanted to cushion no-fault losses, such insurance decisions were
better left to the market. 6 6 More decisively, shifting losses through
tort would not insure the loss by spreading it, but would rather ar-
bitrarily shift it to an individual defendant who was only the
164. He did this in cases of private takings such as later theorists have discussed mostly in
connection with Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). Holmes
discussed the issue in connection with the old English case of Gilbert v. Stone, 82 Eng. Rep. 539
(K.B. 1648), in which the defendant stole plaintiffs horse under duress of a threat to his life, and
was nevertheless held civilly liable to the owner. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 78, at 118. Cf.
Spade v. Lynn, 172 Mass. 488, 489 (1899).
It is a question which deserves more discussion than it has received, whether a
man is answerable for an injury inflicted upon an innocent stranger knowingly,
or with sufficient notice of the danger, if the injury is an unavoidable incident
of lawful self-protection. It might be said, and it has been held, when it is a
question of paying damages, that a man cannot shift his misfortunes to his
neighbor's shoulders.
Id. (citations omitted). For the classic discussions of the Vincent doctrine, see Francis Bohlen,
Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and Personality, 39
HARV. L. REV. 307 (1926); Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 401 (1959). Some corrective justice theorists analyze liability of the Vincent type as based
on unjust enrichment rather than tort. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 4, at 196-98.
165. He discussed a number of older rules of strict liability to illustrate "the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing rules based on other grounds of policy [i.e. strict liability rules] from those which
have been worked out in the field of negligence." THE COMMON LAW, supra note 78, at 121-26.
166. "The state might conceivably make itself a mutual insurance company against acci-
dents, and distribe the burden of its citizens' mishaps among all its members ... Universal in-
surance, if desired, can be better and more cheaply accomplished by private enterprise." Id. at
78.
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chance instrument of the plaintiffs loss. This would not only be
unwise, but unjust. 67
In that famous passage, Holmes was debating which princi-
ple should generally govern accidental injuries, fault or strict li-
ability. He vigorously supported fault as the ruling general princi-
ple, 68 but we must remember that this is the same Holmes who is
famous for insisting that "general principles do not decide concrete
167.
The undertaking to redistribute losses simply on the ground that they resulted
from the defendant's act would... be open to ... the still graver [objection] of
offending the sense of justice. Unless my act is of a nature to threaten others
... it is no more justifiable to make me indemnify my neighbor against the con-
sequences, than to ... compel me to insure him against lightning.
Id. at 77-78. The latter argument is the one he would qualify in the 1890s, recognizing that strict
tort liability placed upon enterprises was indeed genuine (if compulsory) insurance, because its
cost could be statistically predicted and spread to the customers. See supra note 155.
168. This is where David Rosenberg errs, in seeing Holmes as arguing, not for fault over
strict liability, but for a restricted form of strict liability ("foresight-based") over a more extensive
C'cause-based") form. ROSENBERG, supra note 156, at 5-6. I believe that Rosenberg is led astray
by the fact that Holmes' account of negligence treats the creation of a substantial risk of injury
as culpable, without explicitly taking account of the cost of avoidance; this makes his version of
negligence resemble some present-day descriptions of strict liability. But Holmes simply held to
the "non-balancing" interpretation of negligence that was usual in his day, and that is still advo-
cated by many, as a proper interpretation of what should count as culpable behavior. See Bolton
v. Stone, 850 A-C. 867 (1951) (Lord Reid's speech provided the standard citation for the non-
balancing conception of negligence in Commonwealth law); WEINRIB, supra note 4, at 147-52;
Richard Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
NEGLIGENCE 249, 251 (David G. Owen ec, 1995) (arguing that as a matter of positive law the
Hand balancing test fails to explain how the courts treat negligence); Stephen Perry, The Impos-
sibility of General Strict Liability, 1 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 147, 169-71 (1988). In
American case law and commentary, the balancing conception of negligence did not become
popular until at least a generation after Holmes wrote. See lichael D. Green, Negligence = Eco-
nomic Efficiency: Doubts, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605 (1997).
Holmes made very clear that the main standard of liability he argued for was fault-based (al-
beit objective) negligence, which was rooted in blameworthiness. Thus the reason there was no
liability in the typical horse rundown case where nothing suggested special danger was that "the
defendant is not to blame." THE COMION LAW, supra note 78, at 75. And with respect to the
early English cases "liability in general, then as later, was founded on the opinion of the tribunal
that the defendant ought to have acted otherwise, or, in other words, that he was to blame." Id. at
82 (emphasis added). He summarized "the general notion upon which liability to an action is
founded" as "fault or blameworthiness in some sense" Id. at 85 (using "some sense" to refer to the
objective test) (emphasis added). He referred in passing to "[t]he rule that the law does, in gen-
eral, determine liability by blameworthiness," id. at 87 (emphasis added), and, again in a self-
conscious summary, said that the law does not "in general" hold a man liable for unintended
injury unless "he might and ought to have foreseen the danger, or, in other words, unless a man
of ordinary intelligence and forethought would have been to blame for acting as he did," id. at 88
(emphasis added). In "some cases" (by contrast to the general case) lawmakers "put the mark
higher ... than the point established by common practice at which blameworthiness begins." Id.
at 92 (emphasis added). And after the more extended discussion of the exceptional cases of strict
liability in Lecture IV, Holmes finally summarized his doctrine as "in the main" deriving the test
of tort liability from popular moral notions of blame, objectified, that is: "whether [defendanes]
conduct would have been wrong in the fair average member of the community." Id. at 128 (em-
phasis added).
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cases."'169 Principles to him were not absolutes. This did not mean
they were empty or useless; rather they served as guidelines and
default rules, subject to exceptions and decreasingly applicable by
degree as they diverged from their paradigm instances. 170
The structure of Holmes' tort theory well illustrated these
aspects of his treatment of legal principles. His general principle of
liability was negligence, which provided the conceptual center for
tort law, covered "the great mass" of cases, and supplied the default
doctrine. But it allowed for exceptions at both ends of the contin-
uum it dominated. At times something more than negligence was
required for liability, as with the intentional torts. (Indeed, some-
times even intentional wrongdoing was not enough, and the law
granted an absolute privilege.) Objective negligence shaded into
deliberate wrongdoing at that end of the spectrum, as courts first
found intent or malice from knowledge of facts suggesting a very
high likelihood of injury, and then eventually came to equate intent
or malice in the legal sense with this knowledge.
At the other end of the spectrum were another group of ex-
ceptions to the principle that based liability on objective negligence.
Sometimes the law imposed strict liability for policy reasons of de-
terrence, as with extra-hazardous activities, 171 and other times it
did so on the basis of a principle of corrective justice. 172 No sharp
169. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
170. Indeed he gave the first formulation of this central idea of his jurisprudence in The The.
ory of Torts, supra note 32, at 330-31 (describing the "core-penumbra" structure of most general
legal concepts). In the Lochner dissent, he noted that while general principles do not "decide"
cases, they can "carry us far toward the end." Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75.
171.
There is no more certain way of securing attention to the safety of the men..
than by holding the employer liable for accidents ... [T]hey probably will hap-
pen a good deal less often when the employer knows that he must answer for
them if they do.
Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 432-33 (1919) (Holmes, J., concurring). To
make the deterrence argument convincing, the party to the interaction who is made strictly
liable should have most of the opportunities for taking care. See William Jones, Strict Liability
for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1751 (1992); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW, 310-11 (1987) (pointing out in
regards to worker's compensation that making employers strictly liable reduces workers' safety
incentives). Holmes may well have doubted that this asymmetry obtained in the hazardous
employment situation, and it seems unlikely he would have voted for employer liability or
worker's compensation laws as a legislator; thus he told a correspondent in 1908 that "little as I
liked the Ace' he had voted to uphold the constitutionality of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act. THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND LEWIS
EINSTEIN, 1903-1935, 33-34 (James Bishop Peabody ed., 1964).
172. This is the Gilbert v. Stone idea, which Holmes confined to intentional torts in The
Common Law. See supra note 148. Later Holmes came to see that a version of the Gilbert argu-
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line divided the domains of fault and strict liability; they shaded
into each other where rules could plausibly be characterized either
as specifying negligence or as implementing the policies behind
strict liability.173
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite his famous jurisprudential slogans on behalf of a
functional approach to legal theory, Holmes was not a jurist who
habitually took careful account of social facts or even generally
showed sound practical judgment on questions of public policy. As
he admitted himself on occasion, he was really a philosophically-
minded legal theoretician with deficiencies as a policymaker.17 4 Had
he been a more practical sort, we might imagine that he shrewdly
observed the surge of litigation over accidental injuries stemming
from technological and industrial developments, and then con-
sciously shaped his theory of torts to center it around an idea (ob-
jective negligence) that was particularly well-suited to this newly
dominant subject matter.
But given Holmes' intellectual proclivities, any such practi-
cal insight or motivation is unlikely, and there is no evidence for it
in his writings on torts. Rather his published essays leading up to
1873 show him single-mindedly pursuing the jurisprudential proj-
ect of systematic reclassification of the substantive law. Here as
elsewhere, he wanted to connect his work in law to the great world
of ideas, to science and philosophy. The reward he wanted was the
approval of the few fellow legal scholars and thinkers whose opinion
ment supported forms of enterprise liability like workers' compensation. See supra note 155.
Thus in the Arizona case he gave it as an alternative rationale for the statute:
It is reasonable that the public should pay the whole cost of producing what it
wants and a part of that cost is the pain and mutilation incident to production.
By throwing that loss upon the employer in the first instance we throw it upon
the public in the long run and that is just.
The Arizona Employers'Liability Cases, 250 U.S. at 433.
173. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 78, at 92-96, 121-26.
174. A point familiar to torts professors who every year teach Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v.
Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927), overruled by Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 105-06
(1934), the decision in which Holmes (who had never driven an automobile) undertook to legis-
late for the whole nation a safety rule requiring motorists at railroad crossings to get out of their
cars to look along the tracks when their view was obstructed. Holmes was aware of his deficien-
cies as a practical policy-maker; thus he contrasted Chief Justice White's attention to "the practi-
cal effect of the decision," properly its "ultimate justification," with his own tendency to Othink of
[the decision's] relation to the theory and philosophy of the law." H012.IES-SHEEHAN
CORRESPONDENcE 58 (David H. Burton ed., 1976); see also Thomas C. Grey, Molecular Motion"
The Holinesian Judge in Theory and Practice, 37 %WM. & MARY L. REV. 19, 39-40 (1995) (provid-
ing similar Holmesian acknowledgements of falliability).
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he respected. And his ultimate hope was that his ideas might enter
into the fabric of the law and eventually exercise power over
events.175
In the law, theories, however brilliant, do not thrive unless
they also serve significant interests. John Norton Pomeroy had
ideas about the organization of the law that, simply regarded as
ideas, may have been as good as Holmes'-yet no one remembers
them. Holmes' theory of torts turned out to have practical strengths
that he never claimed for it, and that he may never have realized it
possessed. Above all, his approach centered tort doctrine around its
emerging primary source of litigation, accidental personal injuries.
At the same time, it established a doctrinal framework flexible
enough to allow a remedial structure originally grounded in intui-
tions of corrective justice to be adapted without too much strain to
modern regulatory and compensatory uses.
It is natural to wonder how much Holmes' theory mattered.
First, to what extent did his conceptual innovations influence the
way we talk about torts today? And then, how much does the way
torts teachers and academic commentators conceive and structure
the subject affect the working tort law? On the first question, I
would ascribe considerable influence to Holmes on the basis of the
evidence I have set out here. On the second, though, little more
than speculation seems justified. There is always room for skepti-
cism, in an enterprise whose life is more experience than logic,
about the influence of categorical arrangements and high-level doc-
trine on the law in action.176
The features of American tort law that seem best to fit
Holmes' conceptual framework might have come out the same
whatever the theories were, and indeed whether or not torts was
accepted as a basic subject. Tort doctrines that combine regulatory
with reparative purposes may have been inevitable in a federal sys-
175. ' To an imagination of any scope the most far-reaching form of power is not money, it is
the command of ideas .... Read the work of the great German jurists, and see how much more
the world is governed today by Kant than by Bonaparte." The Path of the Law, supra note 46, at
405.
176. Thus writing about Holmes' influence on the law of torts, Brian Simpson pointedly dis.
tinguishes between "tort law" and "theorizing about tort law," and writes that "there is not the
least evidence that Dean Langdell, the Continental Pandectists, or even the great Savigny ever
had any effect on the nineteenth-century common law of tort, either in England, the United
States, or anywhere else." Holmes' "theory of tort law," he suggests, was "a purely philosophical
enterprise," of the sort likely to be of interest only in "the world of high legal theory, so typical of
the scholarship associated with American law schools." A.W.B. Simpson, The Elusive Truth
About Holmes, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2027, 2032 (1997) (reviewing DAVID ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN
HOLMES: His THEORY OF TORTS IN HISTORY (1995)).
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tem that generally left private law to the states, while authorizing
the national government to regulate interstate commerce.177 And
attention to private damage suits as a substitute for social insur-
ance seems to have been a likely development, independent of the-
ory, in a country as individualistically resistant to safety-net legis-
lation as the United States. Holmes' theory triumphed as theory,
but in practice maybe it mattered and maybe not.
One interesting possible consequence of Holmes' work re-
mains to be considered. The accident-centered perspective that he
promoted portrays American tort law in a way that makes it excep-
tionally salient in social and political terms, but at the same time
leaves it curiously unstable. When the destiny of torts is tied to the
problem of accidental injury, the subject as a whole becomes vul-
nerable to practical reassessments of the best public policy for
dealing with that problem. If tort is essentially about accidents, it
faces the risk of abolition as a significant body of law today.178
By contrast, corrective justice theorists, who think of tort as
an abstract legal category organized around the distinctively bilat-
eral character of certain paradigmatic wrongs, do not have to worry
in the same way about losing their subject altogether. The inten-
tional wrongs on which Aristotle founded his analysis of corrective
justice179 still remain torts in most legal systems today, even while
these systems increasingly abandon tort as a way of dealing with
accidental injury.
In our present American regime, we take torts for granted as
a fundamental category, and we organize it (with some continuing
177. Congress and the courts have long had to confront the clash of federal regulatory pur-
poses with the doctrinal structure of state tort law, in the contexts both of setting the limits to
federal power where it enters the domain of private law, and determining the pre-emptive force
of the valid exercise of that power. See, eg., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)
(the local tort law treating absence of airbag as design defect, pre-empted as interference with
the purpose of a federal auto safety regulation, meant to encourage the introduction of airbags by
gradual steps); Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912) (holding that the federal
statute eliminating employers' tort defenses in rail workers' negligence suits is a valid safety
regulation of interstate commerce). Holmes himself helped develop this body of law, reading a
federal safety statute broadly to override state tort defenses in his important opinion for a bare
majority of the Court in Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Railway, 205 U.S. 1
(1907) (the Federal Safety Appliance Act's invalidation of assumption of risk as defense in suits
involving conduct violative of Act's safety requirements implicitly prohibits using contributory
negligence to defeat recovery in the area of overlap between the two doctrines).
178. Compare the titles of Stephen Sugarman's law review article and his subsequent book-
Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CAL. L REV. 555 (1985), scaled back to DOING AWAY WITH
PERSONAL INJURYLAw (1989). The original and more ambitious title in a sense stated the reality
of the situation, given how widely held is the accident- centered conception of tort law; that I
trace back to Holmes.
179. ARISTOTLE, supra note 15.
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dissent) around the problem of accidental injury and the concept of
negligence. My argument has been that things need not have
turned out this way. Working in the doctrinally fluid context cre-
ated by the abolition of the forms of action, Holmes re-examined
civil and common law traditions in the light of the latest nineteenth
century jurisprudential notions, and out of the mix he formulated
one plausible theory of torts. His account of the subject happened to
fit with the flow of events and so took hold, and now it strikes us
almost as common sense rather than theory. But we might not even
have adopted torts as a basic legal category at all, much less taken
that particular approach to it. So it is that the law sometimes ar-
rives at a state that seems natural and even inevitable along a path
shaped by-well, by accident.
